Khartoum and Juba risked making long-resident southerners stateless, feeding mistrust between the new states.36 In Darfur and South Kordofan, groups denied Sudanese nationality have cited statelessness as a factor in secessionist conflicts. d) Governance Vacuum: In areas of weak state authority, displaced or stateless populations may become ungoverned. For instance, refugees returning to a conflict zone can tip the balance. During the Rwandan genocide, millions of Hutu refugees streamed into eastern Zaire (now DRC); the refugee settlements later became bases for armed groups (Hutu militias), which helped precipitate renewed war in Rwanda and beyond. e) Human Rights Abuses: Large-scale displacement often comes with protection crises that undermine social cohesion. Sexual and gender-based violence in camps, land dispossession of IDPs, and xenophobic violence undermine trust. The trauma and grievance from such abuses can radicalize communities. 4.1 Empirical Case Studies a) Lake Chad Basin: Over 3 million people have fled Boko Haram violence in Nigeria/Cameroon/Chad. Climate change has exacerbated this: drought shrank Lake Chad, intensifying farmer-herder conflict. In 2021, severe water scarcity triggered communal clashes in Cameroon's Far North (Logone Birni), prompting approximately 60,000 mostly Muslim pastoralists to seek refuge in Chad.37 Aid organizations note that "competition for land, water, and food … has led to an uptick in intercommunal fighting and displacement", illustrating how climate stress, conflict and displacement form a vicious cycle.38 Horn of Africa: Repeated Somali civil wars and EthiopianOgaden conflicts generated millions of refugees to Kenya, Ethiopia, and beyond. Long-term displacement contributed to urban slum growth and, by some accounts, provided fertile ground for recruitment by extremists. b) Great Lakes/Central Africa: In the DRC, decades of war displaced populations and blurred citizenship lines. Rwanda's genocide sent 2.5 million refugees into DRC;39 subsequent conflict in eastern DRC was fueled by genocidaires among them. Conversely, Burundi saw refugee repatriation without full reconciliation fuel the 1993–2005 civil war dynamics. c) Central African Republic (CAR): Repeated coups and sectarian violence (2013 onwards) produced over 1 million IDPs.40 Militia groups exploited refugee flows and fighters abducted villagers. Violence in CAR is closely linked to cross-border displacement with Chad/Sudan. 36 Open Society Foundations, "Nationality Laws Leave Many at Risk of Statelessness in the Two Sudans" (n 7). 37 Refugees International, Climate-Fueled Violence and Displacement in the Lake Chad Basin (n 5) (reporting on the 2021 displacement of approximately 60,000 pastoralists from Cameroon's Far North region to Chad following severe water scarcity). 38 Ibid (quoting aid organisation assessments of intercommunal fighting driven by competition for land, water and food in the Lake Chad Basin). 39 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) ch 2 (on the 1994 Rwandan genocide and mass displacement into Zaire/DRC). 40 UNHCR, "Central African Republic Emergency" (UNHCR Global Focus, 2023), https://reporting.unhcr.org/car (reporting over 1 million IDPs as of 2023).