Chakrabarty: Citizenship Deprivation as an Act of Persecution: Case Study of t acts that are likely to result in death or torture, or oppression of religious beliefs, mala fide imposition of penalties, are at minimum, accepted as acts of persecution. 75 Further, state legislations, such as the Migration Act, 1958 (Cth) of Australia (s. 91R), could still serve as an indicator for what states believe amounts to persecution. The provision states that persecution must result in “serious harm” and arise on account of the individual’s membership, real or perceived, of a protected group. It must also be systematic. It then lists certain acts that could constitute “serious harm” such as: (a) threats to life and liberty, (b) significant physical harassment or ill treatment, (c) denial of access to basic services which directly threaten one’s subsistence. Hathaway’s definition without the systematic (or persistent) element, has also been adopted by the EU’s Qualification Directive (QD). The QD also includes legal, administrative, prosecutorial and judicial acts that are imposed discriminatorily, and denial of judicial redress, under a nonexhaustive list of acts that could amount to persecution.76 Although Hugo Storey adds that such judicial measures must not be merely “shortcomings”, but amount to “flagrant denial” of fair trial rights itself.77 However, qualification purposes demand that there is precision on whether a specific act could amount to persecution. Otherwise, even broadly worded laws can be limited by subjective interpretations. 78 The following subsection deals with whether (or not) deprivation of nationality could amount to persecution. (a) Denial of Nationality as Persecution Lambert and Foster note that nationality withdrawals have not been particularly categorized as “persecution”, since statelessness and refugee-hood have been traditionally conceived as 75 Storey, supra note 65 at 275-278. Qualification Directive, 2004, Articles 9 (1) and (2). Article 9(2) head note reads as: “acts of persecution as identified in paragraph (1) can take the form of…”. 77 Storey, supra note 65 at p. 284. 78 For instance, the Swiss law on persecution {Federal Law on Asylum, art. 3(2)} is seemingly broad (including threat to life, limb or freedom and ‘measures that entail an unbearable psychological pressure’). Although the term was initially inferred as including measures that ‘make it impossible for a person to lead a life of dignity’, in several later cases, acts drastically limiting religious freedom of individuals or acts of ethnic cleansing without murder or torture, have been dismissed as not amounting to persecution. See, Francesco Maiani, “The Concept of “Persecution in Refugee Law: Indeterminacy, Context-sensitivity, and the Quest for a Principled Approach” (2020) online: Les Dossiers du Grihl <http://journals.openedition.org/dossiersgrihl/3896> at footnotes 22-24. 76 Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021 13