communities, this has created increased conflict and restrictions. Additionally, in some rural areas Rohingyas are having to navigate two parallel bureaucratic systems, pay double taxation, and face the risk of arrest and detention from different parallel security forces. This has created a double layer of vulnerability to human rights abuses. For example, one Rohingya woman said, We are concerned about both the junta (SAC) and AA. AA members can arrest Rohingya and beat them without any reason or accuse them with fake cases. We cannot report those illegal and abusive activities to the junta or police. They do not take any actions. This parallel system together with the informal ceasefire has compounded a situation in which Rohingyas feel compelled to comply with (dual) taxation systems, but at the same time they have no representation regarding their grievances, and no viable avenues for redress. Further, their citizenship rights and land rights remain under threat from two different sources. 2.1. SAC: Renewed Restrictions and Administrative Erasure in Post-Coup Rakhine Since the enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law in Myanmar, the vast majority of Rohingyas have been arbitrarily denied citizenship documents and access to citizenship. From the 1990s onwards, Rohingyas in North Rakhine State have faced severe movement restrictions, and a whole range of discriminatory policies targeting them as non-citizens.22 Since the 2021 coup, the power struggles between the military and the ULA-AA, as well as attempts to prevent the movement of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed Rohingya group, meant that increased security measures and checkpoints were put in place by the SAC regime. As a result, Rohingyas have been facing even more restrictions of movement between townships.23 In November 2021, SAC issued an order stating that “Bengalis”, meaning Rohingya, travelling outside their townships are “a threat to local security and rule of law” and can be arrested if they don’t have a permit.24 Rohingyas must bribe the immigration authorities to obtain a permit – the costs of which have sky-rocketed. As a result, Rohingyas and other Muslims in Rakhine state have been struggling to access livelihood opportunities, financial services and local markets.25 Further, Rohingyas who want to apply for ID cards - a requirement for applying for travel permission, are unable to do so in the current post-coup situation. In August 2021, the SAC immigration department launched a mobile scheme called Pann Kinn to increase access to citizenship cards and other registration 6 documents across the country. In Rakhine this was extended to those without documentation in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Kyauktaw townships. With many schools and government offices shut across the country due to the impact of the coup and the civil disobedience movement in Myanmar, the usual ways to obtain identity and registration documents became less accessible. Pann Kinn was largely considered to be a move to ensure people are documented ahead of future elections. Rohingyas as an unrecognised minority no longer have voting rights, so this reasoning did not apply to them.26 The Pann Kinn scheme was only opened to people who belong to an ethnic group recognised by the State. According to the resident from Buthidaung and Sittwe townships, Rohingya and other Muslim communities are barred from applying for identity and registration documents under this scheme. In multiple settings across Myanmar, women and girls who need to apply for identity documents tend to have more limited access than their male counterparts. The high costs, travel and burdensome bureaucratic process involved in security identity documents means that after households have weighed up the cost-benefits of obtaining identity cards for a limited number of family members, they often decide on prioritising male members with more income earning opportunities outside of the home.27 Interviewees also noted that Rohingya women are less likely to have identity documents than men. There are multiple reasons for this. Many have not had access to education and literacy rates amongst Rohingya women are very low. As such, they are unable to fill in applications on their own. Further, a lack of access to Burmese or Rakhine language education, can present insurmountable barriers to navigating burdensome bureaucratic processes such as visits to police stations or immigration offices. This situation is compounded by cultural norms that limit women’s access to the public sphere.28 In the context where rape has been utilised as tool of ethnic persecution and genocide,29 concerns about the risks women and girls may face outside their neighbourhoods, further limit women’s mobility. As such, administrative procedures that require individual identity cards as a pre-requisite for travel, further impact women’s mobility within Rakhine State. This can mean that in order to travel through checkpoints, women and girls must increasingly rely on male members of the household, and on brokers, leaving households more vulnerable to the escalating costs of bribery and other associated risks should they need to travel beyond the neighbourhood. Without citizenship cards, most Rohingyas are reliant on household registration documents or ‘family lists’ to prove their permanent residency. Regular checks are made by immigration and other officials. Family members are cancelled from the list if they are absent during these