2021] 131 NATIONALITY LAWS dispositive norms.” 209 Likewise, Special Rapporteur Tladi summarizes this section of his 2017 report with the following words: “a provision in a treaty should, as far as possible, be interpreted in a way that renders it consistent with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).”210 The question of whether a jus cogens norm is to be taken into account in the process of treaty interpretation turns on “the applicability of such a rule in a specific case.”211 This requires a two-fold inquiry. First, what is the content of the jus cogens norm (in this case, the norm of racial non-discrimination) and how do matters of nationality fit within this scope? Second, what does this mean for a principled interpretation of Article 1(3)? B. Content of the Discrimination Jus Cogens Norm of Racial Non- Turning first to the content or identification of the norm itself, while it is the case that the prohibition on racial discrimination is broadly recognized as a jus cogens norm of international law,212 the precise content of racial discrimination is often left unaddressed, with pronouncements to the effect that 209 Cezary Mik, Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 33 POL. Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 73 (2013). 210 Special Rapporteur, Third Report on Jus Cogens, supra note 196, ¶ 67–68 (internal quotations omitted). See also Int’l L. Comm’n, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens): Text of the Draft Conclusions and Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.936, (May 29, 2019) (Draft Conclusion 20 adopts a rule to interpret other rules of international law consistently with jus cogens norms as far as possible). 211 Mik, supra note 209, at 74. 212 See ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 2010); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, IDENTIFICATION OF PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (2006); Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 211, 219 (1997); NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1991) [hereinafter, LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW]; Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 239, 240 (2005); THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 408 (1998). Int’l L. Comm’n, Fifty-Third Session, supra note 203, at 85 (listing the problem of “racial discrimination” as a peremptory norm “clearly accepted and recognized” by international and national tribunals); Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 193, ¶ 374; Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), ¶¶ 56–61, 91–135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/727 (Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on Jus Cogens]; Comm. on Elimination Racial Discrimination, Rep. on the Sixtieth Session and SixtyFirst Session, Supplement at 107, U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (Nov. 1, 2002).