2023] SPECTER OF STATELESSNESS 343 This goes far beyond the mere loss and damage “dialogue” put in place at Glasgow. While the precise arrangement of these funding requirements have not yet been established, a loss and damage “transitional committee” is working throughout the year in the run up to COP-28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. This committee’s goal is to make specific recommendations on how to operationalize the loss and damage fund. Relatedly, climate negotiators in Egypt made further progress to operationalize the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage. This provides technical assistance to developing nations vulnerable to the climate effects. Despite their promises to alleviate harm caused to the most vulnerable nations — and recent progress at Egypt—it remains to be seen when and to what extent the world’s largest carbon emitters will fund loss and damage.75 Still, the establishment of a loss and damage fund and the request for an ICJ opinion demonstrate recent progress on loss and damage, insuring that this will remain alive on the international climate agenda. And the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (“AOSIS”) will continue to play a role as the conscience of climate negotiators. Weighty questions arise. What does climate justice mean for the billions in the Global South and the developing world? What is the role of international governance in this crisis? What is the responsibility of the developed world to the developing world? III. ENVISIONING AN INCREASED ROLE FOR A “CLIMATE-SECURITY” COUNCIL Climate change has been aptly described as a “super-wicked problem” and the “mother of all collective action problem[s].”76 It will result in mass migration, starvation, pandemics, and cascading levels of armed conflict.77 The resulting uptick in conflicts over natural resources and food will require increased Security Council engagement. As such, the Council should take proactive steps today to ameliorate future human suffering and conflict before it happens. It has the legal authority to do so, but political realities exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have hampered Council action on climate. A. LEGAL AUTHORITIES & RECENT ACTION ON CLIMATE Beyond the questions swirling around loss and damage, the specter of statelessness strikes at the heart of the U.N. Charter’s emphasis on sovereignty, inviting a greater role for Security Council engagement. After all, the Council plays a 75. See Michael Jacobs, Reflections on COP26, 93 POL. Q. at 276 (2021). 76. See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009); Steven R. Brechin, Climate Change Mitigation and the Collective Action Problem: Exploring Country Differences in Greenhouse Gas Contributions, 31 SOCIO. F. 846, 846 (2016) (describing climate change as the collective action problem of our era). Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change: Reversing the Past and Advancing the Future, 115 AM. J. INT’L. L. UNBOUND 80 (2021). 77. For an overview of climate change’s security implications, see CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4223806