342 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:331 and future climate harm.67 This reality was highlighted in the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact, which failed to establish a funded loss and damage facility.68 Developing nations sought the creation of a “facility” that would set in motion more concrete financial commitments to compensate for climate harm.69 Instead, Glasgow created a mere “dialogue” between parties. This was designed to “minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change.”70 Following the lack of progress at Glasgow, SIDS labeled the absence of a funded loss and damage mechanism a “gaping hole” in the Framework Convention and international efforts to fully address climate impacts.71 The Framework Convention is the proper legal forum to implement a lasting loss and damage mechanism. Why? First, the Framework Convention has near universal adoption, and its status as a treaty within the United States insures that the world’s largest historical GHG emitter is included. Second, the Framework Convention possesses relevant expertise and the yearly Conference of Parties provide a regular forum to address climate matters and adjust as needed. Perhaps not surprisingly, SIDS have argued that loss and damage should be resourced, funded, and incorporated as a third pillar within the Framework Convention alongside mitigation and adaptation. SIDS continue to urge developed nations to show more ambition and commitment to tackling the climate crisis.72 Small island nations have advocated for a U.N. resolution to establish a legal framework to protect the rights of people displaced by climate change.73 A breakthrough on loss and damage occurred at COP-27 in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt in 2022. In a positive sign in the runup to the conference, U.S. climate envoy John Kerry committed the U.S. to participate in loss and damage conference discussions.74 After weeks of intense climate negotiations, COP-27 established a dedicated loss and damage fund with the goal of compensating developing nations. 67. See, e.g., David Gelles, After Decades of Resistance, Rich Countries Offer Direct Climate Aid, N.Y. TIMES, at A9 (Nov. 9, 2022) (noting “wealthy nations . . . have avoided calls to help poor countries from climate disasters, fearing that doing so could open them to unlimited liability”). 68. See, e.g., Nevitt, supra note 34. 69. See, e.g., Nevitt, supra note 34. 70. Glasgow Climate Pact, art. 58 (Nov. 13, 2021). For a discussion of this failed effort, see Michael Jacobs, Reflections on COP26: International Diplomacy, Global Justice and the Greening of Capitalism, 93 POL. Q. 270, 276 (2021). 71. Glasgow Climate Pact, art. 58 (quoting Submission of Nauru on behalf of The Alliance of Small Island States, Views and information on elements to be included in the recommendations on loss and damage in accordance with decision 1/CP.16, Subsidiary Body on Implementation (Sept. 28, 2012) at 1). 72. Adelle Thomas et al., Climate Change and Small Island Developing States, 45 ANN. REV. ENV’T. RES. 1, 16 (2020). 73. SIDS have also requested the U.N. to appoint a “Special Rapporteur on Climate and Security” to help manage climate security risks and provide support to vulnerable countries to develop climatesecurity risk assessments. Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Development, Coral Reefs: Strategies for Ecosystems on the Edge (June 1, 2021). 74. Lindsay Maizland, COP27 Climate Summit in Egypt: What to Expect, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://perma.cc/J54C-QMUM. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4223806