64 Azadeh Dastyari and Asher Hirsch soft power.47 The greatest cost of Australia’s determination to process and detain asylum seekers and refugees offshore has, however, been borne by the asylum seekers and refugees themselves. Interdiction at Sea In addition to an extraterritorial processing and detention regime for people who arrive irregularly by boat, Australia has also attempted to prevent refugees from arriving by boat through an interdiction regime. “Interdiction” in this context means actions taken at sea to prevent vessels from reaching their intended destination, in this case Australia.48 Australia initially introduced an interdiction program named “Operation Relex” in 2001. While this regime was in effect, twelve vessels were detected attempting to reach Australia. Of these, four were successfully intercepted and returned to Indonesia, three ultimately sank, and the rest were intercepted and passengers were taken to Christmas Island, Nauru, or Papua New Guinea.49 Under the Labor Government, from 2007 to 2013, no boats were turned back. However on September 18, 2013, 11 days after the Liberal-National Coalition won back power in the federal election, then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott implemented “Operation Sovereign Borders,” a “military-led response to combat people smuggling and to protect [Australia’s] borders.”50 Operation Sovereign Borders involved a staunch commitment that all asylum seekers arriving by boat would be turned back to their country of departure. From September 2013 until July 2015, 20 boats carrying at least 633 passengers were intercepted and returned to their countries of departure, including to Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Indonesia.51 A number of these turnbacks involved “enhanced screening” at sea, which is a cursory assessment to determine if anyone being returned is a refugee. This policy of enhanced screening prevents asylum seekers from making a detailed refugee claim and denies them any procedural fairness. W. Maley, “Australia’s Refugee Policy: Domestic Politics and Diplomatic Consequences” (2016) 70(6) Australian Journal of International Affairs 670–680. 48 D. Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 4; A. Dastyari, United States Migrant Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees in Guantánamo Bay (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 3. 49 A. Schloenhardt and C. Craig, “‘Turning Back the Boats’: Australia’s Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at Sea” (2015) 27(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 536–572 at 538, https://doi .org/10.1093/ijrl/eev045. 50 Ibid., at 548. 51 J. Phillips, “Boat Arrivals and Boat ‘Turnbacks’ in Australia since 1976: A Quick Guide to the Statistics,” Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, September 11, 2015, www.aph.gov .au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/ Quick_Guides/BoatTurnbacks. 47 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108914994 Published online by Cambridge University Press