religion, were arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured, and state security forces committed rape and other human rights violations in complicity with FPI supporters. In the worst single incident attributed to gendarmes from the Abobo base in Abidjan, the bodies of fifty-seven young men were discovered in Youpougon, on the outskirts of Abidjan, on October 27, 2003, a massacre that became known as the Charnier de Youpougon. A United Nations inquiry into the massacre concluded that the responsibility for the massacre rested squarely with members of the gendarmerie, yet those responsible for the killings and other election-related violence have yet to be properly investigated and brought to justice. The April 2001 trial of eight paramilitary gendarmes in connection to the Youpougon massacre led to their acquittal due to “lack of evidence”.16 Although the government of Côte d’Ivoire stated its intention to reopen the investigation in 2002, this initiative has been put on hold since the war began in September 2002. In late-2001 and early-2002, President Gbagbo organized a reconciliation forum which included the representatives of all four key political parties: Gbagbo’s FPI, Ouattara’s RDR, Bédié of the PDCI and Guei’s Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire party (Union pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire, UDPCI). Despite this largely symbolic gesture, political tension remained high in several parts of the country as local municipal elections approached in July 2002. In the west, where the political campaign inflamed the pre-existing tensions over land, young supporters of the FPI, PDCI and RDR clashed in Daloa in late-June 2002, resulting in at least four deaths and the burning of two mosques and a church.17 The violence also spread to villages around Daloa, where groups of young Bété, Gueré, Burkinabé and northern Ivorian villagers burned each other’s villages and homes and thousands were displaced to Daloa and Duekoué. September 2002: from army “mutiny” to civil war In August 2002, President Gbagbo announced a government of national reconciliation, with representation of the four principal political parties in his cabinet. General Guei, however, refused to accept the cabinet post reserved for his UDPCI party. Shortly thereafter, early in the morning of September 19, 2002, heavy shooting broke out in Abidjan while simultaneous attacks took place in the northern towns of Korhogo and Bouaké. Initial speculation on the backing for the attempted coup centered on Guei. However General Guei, his wife, and Boga Doudou, the Minister of the Interior, were all killed on September 19 in Abidjan. It soon emerged that the uprising was initiated by soldiers who had been recruited into the army by Guei and feared demobilization under President Gbagbo, and that the “mutiny” was in fact an organized rebel movement, the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI) whose origin was rather less spontaneous than it first appeared. The attempted coup was led by a number of junior military officers who had been at the forefront of the 1999 coup, but left President Guei’s regime after he became increasingly hardline. Several of the officers were detained and tortured under Guei and had fled to Burkina Faso, where they certainly received training and possibly other forms of support in the two years between their exile from Côte d’Ivoire and their return on September 19, 2002. The total number of MPCI troops in the first weeks of the mutiny is estimated to have been no more than about eight hundred and recruitment of additional forces took place, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. At least five hundred Maliens joined up in September 2002, lured by promises of 10,000 CFA (approximately $17) per day.18 However, many returned in early-2003 after the money supply dwindled. The MPCI also recruited hundreds of “dozos,” traditional hunters with family hunting rifles who are a common sight in rural Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and southern Burkina Faso. At least some of the dozos recruited by the MPCI were Burkinabé and Malien immigrants who were long-time residents of Côte d’Ivoire. The government’s initial response to the rebellion was to launch a security operation in the economic capital, Abidjan. This consisted of hundreds of security force members descending on low-income neighborhoods—the 16 The trial was held in the camp of the Agban gendarmerie. Given the setting and the lack of security guarantees, the fact that the two survivors and other witnesses to the events were reluctant to testify is hardly surprising. 17 Timothé Dro, “Daloa: Mosquee et Eglise incendiées,” Soir Info, June 26, 2002. 18 Human Rights Watch interview, Mali, February 20, 2003. Human Rights Watch 9 August 2003, Vol. 15, No. 14 (A)

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