observed, the methods Israel uses to enforce Gaza’s land and naval buffer zones “raise serious concerns under international law”.192 The establishment and continuous reinforcement of Gaza’s naval and land buffer zones show Israel’s disregard for the principles of legality and participation, insofar as those zones were arbitrarily self-imposed by Israel on Palestinians, not giving them the right to appeal against it in courts. Moreover, the very fact that the land buffer zone only applies to the Palestinian side of the fence surrounding the Gaza Strip raises question about the fairness or equality of what constitutes a de facto zoning policy. Finally, the irregular way Israel reinforces such buffer zones – both land and naval – demonstrates a lack of rationality in their application. The blockade on Gaza “has had a devastating impact on the lives and wellbeing of Gaza’s civilian population and on Palestinian development”,193 while Israel’s control over exports “determines which of Gaza’s industries will function”.194 Along with the cyclical escalations of conflict (in 2008/2009, 2012 and 2014, most notably), the blockade has rendered 80% of Gaza’s residents dependent on humanitarian aid for their survival.195 In addition, by controlling the entry of construction materials, Israel curbs the reconstruction of the region, whose infrastructure and private buildings are severely damaged during Israel’s operations. Two years after “Operation Cast Lead” (2008/2009), only 13.3% of the families whose homes were totally destroyed or damaged have rebuilt their homes, while 86.6% were not able to do so “because they did not receive the assistance necessary to rebuild them”.196 Similarly, in late 2012, after “Operation Pillar of Defense”, Israel’s blockade, once again, “seriously undermined the provision of essential services in Gaza”, and its ban on construction materials kept those internally displaced from rebuilding their homes.197 Therefore, Israel’s restrictions on the entry of construction materials not only prevents Gaza from reestablishing its social and economic life after its devastating wars, but also functions as a tool of forced displacement, preventing those displaced from rebuilding (and returning) to their homes. Furthermore, such control over the entry of construction materials allows Israel to curb the urban development of Gaza and to influence its shape: for example, in 2010, Israel’s “Coordinator 192 OCHA - Occupied Palestinian Territories, Access Restricted Areas (ARA) in the Gaza Strip, 1. 193 Hartberg, Beyond Ceasefire, 1. 194 Bashi and Feldman, Scale of Control, 14. 195 Norwegian Refugee Council, “A Crisis Within a Crisis: Humanitarian Emergency in the Gaza Strip.” 196 Al Mezan, Ongoing Displacement: Gaza’s Displaced Two Years after the War, 5. 197 Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights, Violations of International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed by the Israeli Occupation Forces in the Reporting Period: 14 November 2012–21 November 2012, 2–3. 54