discussed then, the situation of stateless persons (non-refugees) was left for consideration at a later date. A reading of the preamble to the Refugee Convention further indicates a ‘strong human rights language’. 302 Specifically, the Preamble affirms the principle of nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as those set out in the UDHR. Combatting discrimination is therefore a fundamental purpose of the Convention. More generally, it is now the common view that ‘Refugees are owed international protection precisely because their human rights are under threat’ and that ‘Human rights principles … should inform the interpretation of the definition to who is owed that protection’;303 a strong interrelationship therefore exists between human rights principles and refugee protection, based on the Preamble. With reference to Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the case law surveyed above indicates that not all stateless persons are refugees. Firstly, there is overwhelming agreement and support amongst courts across the world that the inability (by being stateless) to return to one’s country of former habitual residence due to practical obstacles does not amount to persecution. What matters is whether the applicant can demonstrate a well-founded fear of being persecuted on the five listed grounds. Courts generally acknowledge a clear link between persecution and arbitrary denial of nationality resulting in the denial of the right to return, and therefore assess persecution by reference to issues of nationality. Secondly, the very lack of nationality may itself lead to severe discrimination amounting to persecution, without consideration of return.304 This scenario is captured in the case law of domestic courts, which shows divergence in the level of severity required for discriminatory treatment(s) to amount to persecution. For example, the NZ RSAA and the US Court of Appeal accept as persecution the denial of nationality together with the social and economic problems faced by a stateless person provided these problems are sufficiently intolerable or causing unbearable suffering. The case law of the US and German courts ought to be flagged in this context as it contains elements of good practice. US courts (and similarly the German Federal Administrative Court) view statelessness as a sufficiently deplorable condition itself to amount to persecution provided it occurs on account of a protected ground, such as, ethnicity or membership in a protected group,305 and this regardless of the consequences of the act of denationalization. This approach must be praised for it recognizes denationalization for what it is: a severe and serious violation of human rights that entails ‘the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society’.306 Hence, the misfortune is ‘not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to UNHCR, Interpreting Article 1, p.1. UNHCR Interpreting Article 1, p.2. See also, Storey, ‘Persecution: Towards a Working Definition’. 304 See in particular para.54 of the UNHCR Handbook: ‘… It is only in certain circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn his livelihood, his right to practice religion, or his access to normally available education facilities’. 305 The United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol, and this practice reflects that advocated in para.51 of UNHCR Handbook. 306 US Supreme Court, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-2. 302 303 53