reach the threshold of persecution because discrimination is not the same as persecution. In some of their decisions, the UKAIT, the New Zealand RSAA and one of Germany’s High Administrative Court have specifically required the existence of an institutionalized, widespread or systematic discrimination resulting in severe violations of basic human rights (whether civil and political, or social, economic and cultural). Accordingly, the UKAIT recognizes that undocumented Bidoons in Kuwait have been persecuted as a particular social group or because of their race – but not documented Bidoons or undocumented stateless Palestinians (e.g., in Lebanon). The UK courts have also held that in no circumstances may the practicalities of return/re-admission influence the issues of persecution and well-foundedness. The NZ RSAA recognizes that living in abject poverty, with no welfare, no right to work and no adequate standard of living, taken ‘cumulatively together with the precariousness’ of one’s existence constitutes persecution on ground of nationality (since nationality includes lack of nationality and therefore statelessness). The Australian RRTA recognizes non-citizen Latvians of Russian origin in Latvia as a particular social group but denies them protection if ‘a selective and discriminatory withholding of State protection’ cannot be shown. The United States and in Germany, the Federal Administrative Court, stand alone for recognizing that ethnically motivated denationalization resulting in statelessness could constitute persecution, even regardless of the consequences. 5 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS ON THE INTEPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION What does the above discussion tell us about the correct interpretation of Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention in relation to stateless persons? Article 31(1) VCLT requires the treaty’s provision to be interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Article 31(2) VCLT further explains that the ‘context’ shall comprise the text, including its preamble, as well as any subsequent agreement, such as the 1967 Protocol, and Article 31(3)(b) that ‘any subsequent practice in the application if the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ shall also be taken into account. The limitations of ‘ordinary meaning’ and recourse to ‘context’, ‘object and purpose’ as well as ‘subsequent practice’, within the context of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention as it applies to refugees with a nationality, have been thoroughly discussed in the doctrine.301 However, no systematic argument has been made to date on the ordinary meaning of words, context, object and purpose of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as it applies to stateless persons. The discussion above indicates that historically, denial of nationality or statelessness was often linked with being a refugee; the two situations became separated during the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and whereas refugees (including stateless refugees) were 301 See note 2, supra. 52