In 2001, Zimbabwe enacted a policy that required holders of Zimbabwean citizenship to furnish proof of renunciation of all citizenships to which they were eligible (ISI 2014, 67; Manby 2015, 233-234). Many Zimbabweans with parents and grandparents from neighboring countries lacked identification and registration documents and were unable to secure documentation proving that they had renounced citizenship in their families’ countries of origin (ISI 2014, 67; Manby 2015, 234-235). Correspondingly, they were not able to confirm their Zimbabwean citizenship. In 2003, Zimbabwe loosened its requirements, permitting those with foreign backgrounds to confirm Zimbabwean nationality without proof that they have renounced foreign citizenships. This policy, however, was not applied retroactively, and many remained without nationality (Manby 2015, 240). In 2013, Zimbabwe recognized the citizenship of individuals born in Zimbabwe before that year, who had at least one parent from a neighboring country, provided they were habitually resident in Zimbabwe (ibid., 244). It also recognized the citizenship of children of unknown parentage born in Zimbabwe (ibid.). As of 2014, these laws had not been fully implemented and some individuals may remain stateless despite policy changes (Ridderbos 2009). Zimbabweans abroad may be at particular risk of statelessness. The 2013 law does not guarantee the right to Zimbabwean citizenship of Zimbabweans with foreign ancestry who habitually reside outside of Zimbabwe (UNHCR 2014e, 4). Zimbabweans of Mozambican, Malawian, or Zambian descent are potentially stateless or potentially at risk of statelessness. Additionally, children of Zimbabwean parents born in third countries are potentially stateless or potentially at risk of statelessness. Mozambicans who fled for Zimbabwe during its civil war and subsequently returned to Mozambique in the 1990s may be stateless. Many persons in this situation lack documentation to prove their Mozambican nationality and they face harassment and persecution from authorities. They are also generally ineligible for Zimbabwean nationality due to that country’s strict nationality laws (Manby 2015, 240). Such individuals are potentially stateless or potentially at risk of statelessness. Mauritania’s population is comprised of three principal groups: (1) persons of Arab and ArabBerber descent; (2) Black former slaves of Arab Mauritanians known as Haratines; and (3) Black African speakers of Fulani, Wolof, Soninke, and Bambara (Manby 2015, 390). In 1989 and 1990, Mauritania’s Arab-led government, seeking to consolidate control over fertile lands in the Senegal River Valley, expelled 60,000 to 65,000 Black Mauritanians to Senegal (ibid., 391). The government alleged that these deportees were unauthorized immigrants from Senegal. Those perceived to be opposed to the government’s Arabization campaign were explicitly targeted, and the identity documents of many were destroyed during expulsion (ibid.). Following a détente with Senegal in 1994, some of those who had been expelled returned to Mauritania. In 2007, then President Abdallahi expressed intent to repatriate Black Mauritanians expelled to Senegal and restore their citizenship. Some were returned and repatriated (ibid., 393). 33