A Typology of Statelessness other words, Nottebohm was without legal recognition whenever abroad.82 Yet, in Liechtenstein, he had a country of nationality that continued to grant him legal, as well as social, recognition at home and was willing to take responsibility for his protection. Given these circumstances, Nottebohm’s case suggests, therefore, that legal non-recognition and social non-recognition do not necessarily coincide if someone is rendered structurally stateless. Having considered the Nottebohm case as an example of structural statelessness, let us turn to a second example. The citizens of the so-called ‘sinking’ Pacific Islands states are likely to become a historical precedent of de jure structural statelessness. To understand why sinking island states may soon be incapable of guaranteeing the legal recognition of their nationals, one must keep in mind that the legal concept of nationality derives from the existence of statehood. A geographic area that is not a state cannot have nationals. Despite this foundational link, there is no formal definition of statehood in international law. Yet, there seems to be a tacit agreement among the international community in favour of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (‘Montevideo Convention’).83 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention stipulates that a ‘state as an international person should possess [as a matter of fact] the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states’.84 Moreover, art 3 defines the rights of states and their scope according to international law. It declares that: the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.85 Additionally, the Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia: Opinion No 1 (Dissolution of SFRY) confirms this legal definition of statehood. It recommends that ‘the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political authority’.86 In accordance with these definitions, a state loses statehood if it no longer has a (a) permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) government or (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. In the future, sinking island states may lack all these qualities due to climate change and rising sea levels. 82 83 84 85 86 Only in 2006 did the International Law Commission greatly limit the implications of the Nottebohm verdict, thereby protecting all naturalised persons against such an application: United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2) (2006) vol II, 32–33. See Thomas D Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents’ (1999) 37(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 403, 403. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art 1. ibid art 3. Malcolm N Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ (1997) 8(3) European Journal of International Law 478, 492. 249