II. Humanitarian Organizations, Rohingya Identity, and National Verification Cards 66 its earlier iterations, despite that the processes repeatedly failed to restore citizenship to Rohingya or ensure the right to freedom of movement or other basic rights.248 For instance, as mentioned above, on January 29, 2019, U.N. Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener issued a statement in which she failed to use the term “Rohingya” and “encouraged the internally displaced people she met to consider applying for [NVC] registration.”249 The statement also parroted government rhetoric that NVCs are “a first step towards citizenship.”250 Ms. Burgener’s predecessor, U.N. Special Envoy Vijay Nambiar, took a similar position. Mr. Nambiar reportedly pressured Rohingya leaders in Myanmar to abandon their ethnic identity in exchange for associate citizenship status, mentioning that it would facilitate freedom of movement.251 Moreover, for several years, U.N. officials in Myanmar, Geneva, and New York effectively endorsed the NVC process, suggesting that the government was undertaking it in good faith or that it was a pragmatic option in a difficult context.252 In some cases, U.N. officials publicly endorsed the government’s strategy, as in 2014, when a U.N. official in Rakhine State told the Myanmar news media: “The government is engaged in trying to find solutions for the people in the camps, and that solution is through the verification and the citizen process. This is something that the government is very much leading on.”253 Despite ongoing human rights violations related to the process, mixed responses continued yearto-year. An internal U.N. strategy document obtained by Fortify Rights, mapping the U.N. country team’s strategy in Rakhine State for 2015 to 2017 under the former U.N. Resident Coordinator, noted “the positive aspects of the citizenship verification drive,” including that the “process has been voluntary,” which it was not.254 However, subsequent internal documents from UNHCR were critical of the NVC process and the 1982 Citizenship Law.255 248 The government of Myanmar has repeatedly stated that NVCs or their previous iterations would bring Rohingya freedom of movement; however, the government simultaneously clarified that cardholders would still require permission from relevant authorities to travel outside their village or township. For instance, in November 2018, the Director-General of Immigration and Population Department Htay Hlaing claimed the NVC allows free movement within a township—which, of course, is not freedom of movement. See, “Gov’t Affirms Readiness to Repatriate Displaced People from Rakhine State”, Global New Light Of Myanmar, November 12, 2018, http://www.burmalibrary. org/docs25/GNLM2018-11-12-red.pdf (accessed August 23, 2019). 249 U.N. Information Centre, On Behalf of the Office of the Secretary General’s Special Envoy on Myanmar, “Dialogue Will Make Myanmar Stronger,” January 29, 2019, https://yangon.sites.unicnetwork.org/2019/01/30/on-behalf-ofthe-office-of-the-secretary-generals-special-envoy-on-myanmar/ (accessed August 23, 2019). 250 Ibid. 251 Fortify Rights interview with M.S.N., Yangon, Myanmar, August 2015; Fortify Rights electronic communication with M.S.N., August 25, 2019; Fortify Rights electronic communication with the office of the Special Envoy, 2014. 252 Fortify Rights meeting with senior officials, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Switzerland, December 13, 2014; Fortify Rights meeting with the office of the U.N. Special Envoy, New York, New York, March 2014. Early U.N. communications about the citizenship scrutiny process that began in 2012 expressed concern. For instance, the U.N.’s November 2012 Rakhine Response Plan stated: “In early November 2012, community members living in Pauk Taw Township informed that Government officials had commenced a nationality verification exercise. Lack of clear communication to the community on the overall objective of the verification exercise, coupled with reports of intimidation faced by the communities, might increase tensions within the community, and trigger further inter-communal violence and displacement.” UNOCHA, Rakhine Response Plan (July 2012 – June 2013), November 16, 2012, p. 28, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Revised%20Rakhine%20Response%20Plan%20 %28amended%29.pdf (accessed August 23, 2019). 253 Myanmar International TV, “Humanitarian Aid: IDP in Sittwe,” September 6, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=fghr0_O1RDU (accessed August 23, 2019). 254 The document also noted risks involved in the process. Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator, Myanmar, “Framework for U.N. Support to Rakhine State,” internal document, provided to Fortify Rights May 13, 2016, on file with Fortify Rights. 255 UNHCR, Movement Restrictions for Stateless Residents in Rakhine State; UNHCR, Citizenship Verification Exercise in Rakhine State; UNHCR, Citizenship and Statelessness Myanmar.