2022 Statelessness & Citizenship Review (b) 4(2) his or her birth is registered in the Republic in accordance with the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1992 (Act No 51 of 1992).55 The DGLR judgment was the first to address the interpretation and implementation of s 2(2) of the Citizenship Act, which provides citizenship by birth to children born in South Africa who would otherwise be stateless. The ‘otherwise stateless’ provision, a domestication of arts 6 and 7 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child56 and the ACRWC respectively, is accepted as the shortest, most competent route to ending statelessness worldwide. If this provision was employed consistently by all states, statelessness at birth would be eradicated within a generation because no child would be born stateless. As the golden standard for safeguards in a legislative regime seeking to eradicate statelessness, it is important that the provision is interpreted correctly and implemented effectively. The consideration of this case in court aired and resolved several barriers to the efficacy of s 2(2). The judgment contributes to the jurisprudence and development of the law in several ways: by clarifying the ‘best interests of the child’ principle in the context of citizenship rights; by providing the correct approach to determining whether a child is stateless and whether their birth is registered for the purposes of s 2(2);57 by recognising the need for regulations in facilitating the application of the law; and by employing the special statutory review mechanism for citizenship decisions. In summary, DGLR was born in South Africa to two Cuban nationals whom had been residing outside of Cuba for longer than a year and were, under Cuban law, no longer legally able to pass citizenship to their child born abroad. 58 This much was confirmed by the Cuban embassy in a note verbale confirming the official position of the Cuban State.59 DGLR did ‘not have the citizenship or nationality of any other country’ nor did she have the ‘right to such citizenship or nationality’ as stipulated by s 2(2) and was therefore entitled to South African citizenship by birth. The Department of Home Affairs (‘Department’) did not agree and declined to recognise her as such. She approached the Court for an order declaring her to be a South African citizen and directing the Department to issue regulations to s 2(2) for its practical application. These orders were granted and confirmed upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal in 2016.60 Although none of the orders have been complied with at the time of writing this article — which in itself reveals the failure of the Department to implement the law 61 — the judgment’s contribution to the development of the law is important to the cases that follow. 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 Citizenship Act (n 24) s 2(2). Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990). DGLR, ‘Reasons for Order’ (n 53) 5 [12]. DGLR, ‘Founding Affidavit’, Submission in DGLR (n 53) 6–7 [18]–[19]. ibid 8 [27], 9 [31]. Minister of Home Affairs and Others v DGLR (Supreme Court of Appeal, Maya DP, Shongwe, Theron and Swain JJA and Fourie AJA, 6 September 2016) (‘DGLR Appeal’). See, eg, Lawyers for Human Rights, Statelessness in South Africa, Re-opening of Refugee Reception Offices and Processing of Documentation for Refugees, and Asylum Seekers, and Trends on Arrests and Detention of Migrations (Brief to the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, 13 September 2022) 4 [7] <https://static.pmg.org.za/220920LHR_ submission_to_the_PC_Home_Affairs_Sep_2022.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/XU2B4Y9U>. 264