2. Institutionalised Arbitrariness administrative mechanisms may be permitted in certain cases, they must be impartial, adequately resourced, and vested with sufficient legal authority—including the power to impose proportionate sanctions. The HRC has consistently held that administrative remedies are inadequate for addressing grave violations such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture. The same logic applies to the right 44 to nationality, which is often a precondition for accessing all other rights. In Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia,80 the Committee explicitly held that administrative remedies cannot effectively redress violations of this magnitude. This position is echoed in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, which advocate for judicial remedies in cases of gross human rights violations and emphasise the need for independent adjudication to ensure justice.81 Regional human rights systems also stress the necessity of judicial safeguards. In Chahal v. United Kingdom,82 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the lack of judicial review in deportation proceedings violated Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The Court was especially critical of the advisory panel system used by the United Kingdom, which denied individuals access to legal representation, failed to disclose the basis for deportation, and did not bind the Home Secretary. The Court held that an effective remedy is secured only when the body reviewing decisions of the executive meets high standards of independence, impartiality, and procedural fairness. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights reached similar conclusions in Anudo v. Tanzania,83 where it found that Tanzania’s citizenship law violated the right to an effective remedy due to the absence of judicial review in nationality deprivation cases. The Court warned that executive discretion, unchecked by judicial oversight, exposed individuals to arbitrary treatment. Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has consistently emphasised the importance of fair, impartial, and judicially reviewable processes in nationality cases.84 The United Nations Secretary-General has also underscored the importance of judicial review in nationality matters.85 He has warned that leaving such determinations solely to the executive raises serious due process concerns, making individuals vulnerable to arbitrary deprivation of nationality, detention, or deportation. He has specifically called for effective remedies to be available in all nationality-related decisions—remedies that must be accessible, impartial, and subject to independent review. 80 81 82 83 84 85 HRC, ‘Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia’ (27 October 1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, para 8.2. UNGA Res 60/147 (16 December 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/147, paras 12, 23. Chahal v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania (Application No. 012/2015) [2021] AfCHPR 2. Case of the Yean and Bosico Children v. The Dominican Republic, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR), 8 September 2005, para 171; Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR), 28 August 2014, para 356-358. HRC, ‘Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/25/28, para 31, 44.