C. Paulussen problematic for other reasons. For example, it removes important jurisdictional links to try possible offenders, it undermines international cooperation to fight impunity; it can, through its discriminatory character, lead to even more alienation and resentment and thus possible radicalization in minority groups, who are disproportionally targeted by the measure, and finally it can increase long-term security risks.28 Nonetheless, “only” the problematic international human rights law dimension should already be enough to conclude that the measure is not to be resorted to. International humanitarian law Although international human rights law is clearly relevant, and has thus also been discussed in the literature when assessing the legality of the measure,29 the centre of attention of this article will be on discussing the measure from a quite novel perspective, that is, in the context of the International Review of the Red Cross’s main field of focus: international humanitarian law. Indeed, what are the links between deprivation of nationality and international humanitarian law? To start with, and this will not come as a surprise, the measure of deprivation of nationality or citizenship stripping itself is not to be found in conventional30 and customary31 international humanitarian law. This is different for the concept of nationality as such, although it is usually seen as an irrelevant criterion to international humanitarian law,32 for instance when it comes to providing protection and care. An example can be found in Article 12 of the First and Second Geneva Conventions, which stipulates that the protected persons of these Conventions “shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Party [Geneva Convention I]/Parties [Geneva Convention II] to the conflict in whose power they may be, without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria”.33 At other times though, nationality is taken into account, for instance in the context of prescriptions 28 For more on this, see again C. Paulussen, above note 12, pp. 219–249. 29 See especially the work of Laura van Waas in this field, including L. van Waas, “Foreign Fighters and the Deprivation of Nationality: National Practices and International Law Implications”, in A. de Guttry, F. Capone and C. Paulussen (eds), above note 1, pp. 469–487. 30 For this purpose, the texts of the four Geneva Conventions and the three Additional Protocols were searched. 31 For this purpose, the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study of the ICRC, Vol. 1: Rules was searched. 32 See e.g. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I), Arts 18 and 49; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC II), Arts 14, 30 and 50. Nationality is also irrelevant “for determining whether a particular person can be qualified as a combatant and hence is entitled to POW status (with the possible exception of nationals of the detaining power) [original footnotes omitted]”. S. Krähenmann, above note 1, pp. 17–18. 33 See also Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III), Art. 16; and Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV), Art. 13. 612