children, stateless children adopted by Malaysians and children born out of wedlock to Malaysian fathers) and do not include the numbers of stateless persons in Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia) or the West Malaysian states of Kelantan and Terengganu. 12. Several groups at risk of or affected by statelessness have been identified in Malaysia including; persons who have resided in Malaysia since pre-independence as well as their descendants (including individuals of Tamil ethnicity), children of mixed-nationality marriages (through the impact of gender discriminatory nationality laws), indigenous persons (including mobile maritime populations and Orang Asli communities), refugees and irregular migrants (and their children) in Sabah East Malaysia, as well as persons lacking documentation and foundlings.11 13. In March 2022, the Chief Minister of Sabah announced that 810,443 residents of Sabah are non-citizens which mostly comprise the Bajau Laut community.12 This figure is almost double the UNHCR 2019 estimate of 450,000 stateless persons in Sabah. 13 Most of this population has lived in Sabah for multiple generations yet lacks any documentary proof of their connection to their country of domicile or origin. It is unclear whether this population is stateless in its entirety or entitled to citizenship of either Malaysia, the Philippines or Indonesia.14 14. In 2021, of the 115,169 reported stateless persons, 103,380 were stateless Rohingya refugees in Malaysia.15 While previously welcomed and supported by Malaysia, the Rohingya population has never gained full protection due to Malaysia not being party to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol and in recent years is facing discrimination, arrest, detention and boat pushbacks.16 ISSUE I. The Child’s Right to Citizenship and Childhood Statelessness 15. The Malaysian Federal Constitution contains robust safeguards against statelessness. a. According to Section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule “Every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this 11 See Jamie Chai Yun Liew, ‘Homegrown Statelessness in Malaysia and the Promise of the Principle of Genuine and Affective Links’ (2019) 1(1) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 95; Bathmaloshanee M, Maalini Ramalo and Savarana M Sinpan, ‘Report Statelessness in Malaysia’ (DHRRA, April 2022) <https://dhrramalaysia.org.my/wpcontent/uploads/2022/04/STATELESSNESS-IN-MALAYSIA-REPORT-05042022_compressed.pdf>. 12 Durie Rainer Fong, ‘Almost a Quarter of Sabah Residents are Non-Citizens, Assembly Told’, Free Malaysia Today (24 March 2022)<https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2022/03/24/almost-a-quarter-of-sabah-residents-are-noncitizens-assembly-told/>. 13 US Department of State, ‘Malaysia 2021: Human Rights Report’ (April 2022) 25. 14 Bathmaloshanee M, Maalini Ramalo and Savarana M Sinpan, ‘Report Statelessness in Malaysia’ (DHRRA, April 2022) 15 <https://dhrramalaysia.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/STATELESSNESS-IN-MALAYSIA-REPORT05042022_compressed.pdf>. 15 UNHCR, ‘Global Trends 2021’ (June 2022) Annex, Table 5 fn 24. 16 See Christine H Kim, ‘Challenges to the Rohingya Population in Malaysia’, Centre for Strategic & International Studies (10 July 2020) <https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/challenges-rohingya-population-malaysia>; Sui-Lee Wee, ‘6 Rohingya Refugees are Killed Fleeing Detention Centre in Malaysia’, The New York Times (20 April 2022) <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/world/asia/rohingya-refugees-malaysia-deaths.html>. 4