Heisei 30 Nen (Gyou-ko), No 232 may likely exercise extreme wariness towards the plaintiff, who is stateless, given that he does not possess basic ID documents and his identity is unknown. The government could even presume him as a spy from another state. Due to such security concerns, the Georgian government refuses to allow the plaintiff to reenter the state. 53 This refusal, which firmly denies a foundation for the plaintiff’s livelihood or subsistence in the present time, constitutes a continuing, sustained, and serious harm to the plaintiff. Despite the aforementioned potential contributions to the jurisprudence of refugee law, this judgment has several limitations. Firstly, although elements of statelessness are heavily involved in this court case, the Tokyo High Court did not clarify who may be considered a stateless person. While Japan is not a party to the 1954 Convention, the Court should have employed the definition of a stateless person set out in that Convention as a first step in its discussion of this case, as the definition has acquired a customary nature. Secondly, the Court has not explored the meaning of other important terms such as ‘country of former habitual residence’ provided in the Refugee Convention. CONCLUSION It is worth stressing that the Tokyo High Court in this judgment demonstrated the possibility that the hardship of stateless persons can be linked to the term ‘persecution’ even within an administrative or judicial environment where the term is restrictively interpreted as harm to life and body. More remarkably, the judgment has added to the jurisprudence on the idea that the attitude of the state of former habitual residence in refusing re-entry to a stateless person can be evidence of a continuing and sustained harm regarding a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’. It is hoped that in the future, Japanese courts will set out a fundamental framework in which the statelessness factor is comprehensively analysed in the context of refugee protection. 53 ibid 28. 323