2021] NATIONALITY LAWS 89 Article puts forward the thesis that to the extent that matters of nationality are still considered a balancing act between individual rights and the prerogative of states, the interpretive jus cogens principle, as it relates to norms of racial nondiscrimination, tips the balance in favor of equality and nondiscrimination. This Article is organized as follows. Part II considers the significance of racial discrimination in the context of nationality regulation, noting historical and contemporary manifestations of racialized citizenship. In Part III, the Article briefly canvasses the intersection between nationality matters within the reserved jurisdiction of states and the evolution of human rights law, examining the ways in which international law has narrowed states’ prerogative in this domain. Part IV turns to a detailed examination of Article 1(3), considering first its drafting history, and then the Committee’s treatment of the Article, and in particular General Recommendation Thirty. This section examines all individual and inter-state communications that have touched on nationality and provides an overview of relevant concluding observations over a period of thirty years. This Part concludes that the Committee has, to date, failed to articulate a clear and persuasive position that satisfactorily reconciles Articles 1(3) and 5(d)(iii). In Part V, the Article develops the argument that the jus cogens norm of prohibited racial discrimination can operate as an interpretative principle in the context of racialized nationality laws and practices. Part V examines the content of the norm and demonstrates that deprivation of nationality can be considered a form of systemic racial discrimination. Finally, Part VI considers the effects or consequences of racial non-discrimination as a jus cogens norm, and develops an interpretation of Article 1(3) in light of the jus cogens status of racial non-discrimination as a strong interpretive principle. II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS Human rights inhere in a person by virtue of his or her humanity; indeed, international human rights instruments do not generally condition enjoyment of rights on citizenship. Yet, in practice it remains the case that citizenship often operates as a prerequisite for access to basic human rights, 18 famously 18 See, e.g., David Owen, Citizenship and Human Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CITIZENSHIP 247, 250 (Ayelet Sachar et al. eds., 2017).