2021] NATIONALITY LAWS 141 consider is the distinction between differential treatment and prohibited preferences. 252 In General Recommendation ThirtyTwo the Committee noted that differential treatment: “[C]onstitute[s] discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim[.]” As a logical corollary of this principle, . . . [General Recommendation Fourteen] (1993) . . . observes that “differentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate.”253 To assist in understanding how this applies in the context of Article 1(3), it is relevant to recall the drafting history and its focus on post-colonial autonomy and the ability to favor particular national groups. Applying this reasoning to a contemporary example, referring to Israel’s Law of Return, 254 Dan Ernst characterizes the moral difference between what he refers to as “positive” and “negative” nationality-based discrimination. 255 The former “singles out individuals of a particular ethnic, religious, or racial group for automatic admission because of that group’s special entitlement to admission.”256 The latter bars or excludes a group or groups of people because they belong to “an unwanted ethnic, religious, or racial group.” 257 While, according to Ernst, international law clearly prohibits negative nationality-based discrimination, it has been argued that there may exist certain limited circumstances under which nationality-based priorities are 252 See THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 112. omitted). 253 General Recommendation Thirty-Two, supra note 36, ¶ 8 (footnote 254 Law of Return, 5710–1950, LSI 4 114 (1949–1950) (Isr.); Bill and an Explanatory Note, 5710–1950, HH 48 189 (Isr.). See also Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 386–433 (T. Aleinikoff Alexander & Klusmeyer Douglas eds., 2000). 255 Dan Ernst, The Meaning and Liberal Justifications of Israel’s Law of Return, 42 ISR. L. REV. 564, 583–85 (2009). In its General Recommendation Thirty-Two, CERD described the term “positive discrimination” as a contradictio in terminis which should be avoided in the context of international human rights standards. See General Recommendation Thirty-Two, supra note 36, ¶ 12. 256 Ernst, supra note 255, at 584. 257 Id.