Under the present international system, it is presumed that an individual has a nationality unless there is some evidence to the contrary.13 Strictly stated, an individual is not to be treated as de jure stateless unless proven to lack a nationality of any state. When related States have differing opinions, an individual’s nationality may be left uncertain and he or she would be at risk of statelessness (it is generally understood that when a person has been ascertained to be devoid of any nationality, s/he will be regarded as a de jure stateless person). Other examples of risks of statelessness include those who did not have their births registered and therefore have difficulties to confirm the nationality they have acquired at birth.14 Similarly, identification documents can be confiscated during human-trafficking transactions, making it impossible for victims/survivors to prove their nationality and return to their country of origin. They also fall in this category.15 The line between de jure and de facto statelessness is at times rather vague. As Weis notes, “[i]n practice, circumstances vary a great deal from case to case. There are many cases where a person’s nationality status cannot be established, where it is doubtful, undetermined or unknown… The borderline between what is commonly called de jure stateless and de facto stateless is sometimes difficult to draw.” However he goes on to state that “… the latter term is in common use and has acquired a meaning.”16 Although de jure and de facto statelessness have been conceptually differentiated in legal terms, they both essentially refer to persons lacking protection from a state. From this perspective, they should be entitled to equal protection under international law. However, both the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention Regarding the Reduction of Stateless Persons do not extend legally binding protection to de facto stateless persons. Therefore, it must be noted that in principle, these two Conventions extend protection to only de jure stateless persons (reasons for which will be discussed later). 13 Nationality and Statelessness: A Handbook for Parliamentarians (2005), p.11; Bachelor supra note 3, 172, n.39. 14 See generally, Waas, “The Children of Irregular Migrants: A Stateless Generation?” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol.25 (2007), pp.437-58. 15 Brouwer, A., Statelessness in the Canadian Context: A Discussion Paper (2003), p.4. 16 Quoted in Batchelor, C., “Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection,” International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.7 (1995), p.252. 10