JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 5 Turkishness as rooted in ethnolinguistic Turkism and Sunni-Muslim Islam (Erdal, Doeland, and Tellander 2008; Yilmaz 2021). Both notions shape the legal framework for naturalization, as regulated in the Citizenship Law and the Settlement Law in various iterations. Through the Citizenship Law, naturalization can occur through mar­ riage, through a regular pathway for immigrants based on residential and other requirements, and in exceptional circumstances. For the regular naturalization pathway, the parallel Settlement Law restricts who counts as an ‘immigrant’ to those with ‘Turkish descent or culture’ (Kadirbeyoglu 2007), broadly associated with Turkish ethnicity and Sunni-Muslim religion. As a result, throughout the twentiethcentury immigrants thr majority of naturalized citizens were considered of Turkish descent, including about 1.6 million Tatars, Circassians and Bulgarians (Kirişçi 1996). Under the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Develop­ ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), the possibility for exceptional citizenship has been expanded, including on discretionary grounds and through investment in prop­ erty or businesses (Serdar 2023). Syrian refugees in Turkey navigate this field of symbolic belonging and formal criteria for Turkish citizenship. Following Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal crackdown on the Syrian revolution in 2011, about four million Syrians have registered for temporary protection status in Turkey. Temporary protection in theory provides protection from deportation and access to some social rights such as free primary healthcare and edu­ cation (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2021). Syrians under temporary protection can also apply for the kızılaykart cash assistance, funded by the EU and distributed by the Turkish Red Crescent (Ark-Yıldırım and Smyrl 2021). The Presidency for Migration Management, the authority responsible for issuing registration documents, can refer temporary protection holders to UNHCR for resettlement to a third country. Despite this bundle of social rights, temporary protection does not count as ‘full’ refugee status according to the 1951 Geneva Convention and has been termed a status of ‘precarity’ (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2021). While it is temporally indefinite, the status can be revoked by presidential decree at any time. Access to work permits relies on the goodwill of employers who more often hire Syrians as a cheap, informal and exploitable workforce (Ertorer 2021). Many struggle to access housing. Landlords often refuse to rent to Syrians and some municipalities have formally banned renting flat to foreigners (Ertorer 2021). Syrians under temporary protection are excluded from the broader social security systems of Turkey (Ark-Yıldırım and Smyrl 2021). Right to residence, healthcare and education are limited to the province of regis­ tration, or require re-registration which many governorates have stopped since 2018 (Şahin Mencütek et al. 2023). To travel to another province, temporary protection holders require state permission which is often delayed or rejected, even for short visits. As a result, Syrians who move to another province to find work, access education, or unite with family members live in de facto irregularity. If caught, they should be deported to the province of registration but refoulement back to Syria is common (Şahin Mencütek 2022). Syrians under temporary protection also risk losing their status if they leave Turkey. Syrian mobility is thus characterised by "precarious movement", both within and beyond Turkish territory (Baban, Ilcan and Rygiel 2021, 9). Crucially, temporary protection status cannot be changed to a regular residence permit excluding Syrians from the regular pathway towards naturalization. However,