bers have towards it. Yet, as the cases outlined above demonstrate, the voluntarily stateless are claiming their own sovereignty in a challenge to the state system. Rooted in liberal notions of self-ownership, individual sovereignty is linked to anarchist revolt against state power (Hoffman 1998), and generally implies autonomy from external authority.7 I would like to make an important distinction between autonomy from the state and autonomy despite the state. Whereas autonomy despite the state is demonstrated through critical acts of agency within the confines of state legitimacy, autonomy from the state is that which is exercised by those who reject the state system as an affront to their personal liberty. Perhaps an analogy will help clarify the difference. An undocumented person residing in a country irregularly is violating that country’s law and is, therefore, subject to detention and removal. By participating in the underground economy, purchasing and paying taxes on goods, and participating in their communities, 8 these internal outsiders are autonomous in so far as they are able to avoid the detection of state authorities. Such autonomous acts of citizenship (Isin 2017) are exercised within the boundaries of the state, which are seen as legitimate, and typically these people desire formal membership in their host country. Autonomy from the state occurs when one renounces their citizenship in favor of statelessness, because they see the state as illegitimate.9 From this we can ask a number of questions that “Autonomy from the bridge international relations and political theory. How does individual sovereignty interact with the rightsstate occurs when contract between the individual and the one renounces their responsibilities state? How can we understand the relationship becitizenship in favor of tween the individual and society if one prioritizes onestatelessness, because self over the collective? If resistance to belonging to a they see the state as state and disregard of systems of law are a fact of life for some, what does this hold for the sovereign state illegitimate” system as we know it? 7 For a synthesis of the concepts of sovereignty and individual liberty and a subsequent conceptualisation of individual sovereignty, see Ilievski, 2015. 8 Despite the ‘hopelessness’ of statelessness, is has been demonstrated that involuntarily stateless people are able to access, in some way, their ‘life needs’ in the face of not possessing formal rights (Redclift 2013). This typically occurs through the development of support networks both within and outside of national contexts (Baser and Swain 2010; Cons 2012; Mwangi 2017; Hess 2006). 9 This distinction can be understood further if we turn our attention to postanarchist thought. Newman argues that central to postanarchism is the notion of a ‘libertarian politics’, “a politics that seeks autonomy from the state and rejects the idea of representation within the formal channels of political power” (Newman 2011: 314). Distinct from liberal individuality, this ‘libertarian moment’ is the “ultimate ethical and political expression of the twin imperatives of equality and liberty that constitute the very language of emancipation” (Ibid.), and which “cannot be fully realized within the framework of the state” (Newman 2011: 315). The state’s restriction of liberty and equality through oppressing autonomy and selfdetermination through hierarchical principles of obedience demands a rethinking of politics outside of the state – a politics that is autonomous from the state (Ibid). http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home 48