The introduction of this provision was justified by the government because “[g]lobal jihadism poses a substantial threat to the national security of the Netherlands”53 and there was a need to deal with Dutch nationals who left the Netherlands to join jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq (uitreizigers). The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) estimates that a total of 300 people departed from the Netherlands to join jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. Between 11 September 2017 and 6 May 2020 nationality was revoked under Article 14(4) DNA in 21 cases.54 Even as the introduction of this measure was being debated, concerns were raised about its necessity and effectiveness. The AIVD was doubtful of the practical utility of the measure and of the effect on national security because terrorist activity can continue and clandestine return to the Netherlands remains possible. The Netherlands Institute for Human Rights also pointed out that “since withdrawal of Dutch citizenship is limited to persons who have dual or multiple nationality, the measure makes only a very limited contribution to enhancing national security”.55 The provision was ultimately adopted with a sunset clause, such that it would expire in 2022, unless legislation is passed to extend it. An evaluation of the measure was furthermore mandated, which could inform the decision as to whether or not to extend the power. In 2020, two comprehensive evaluations of Article 14(4) DNA were carried out: by the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD)56 and by the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC).57 Neither evaluation provided evidence of the effectiveness of the measure. On the contrary, the CTIVD reiterated that it is “uncertain whether the measure will have the desired effect of preventing return of uitreizigers”. The WODC admits that the question as to whether Article 14(4) has contributed to a decrease in the threat of terrorist activities by members of jihadi organisations on Dutch territory and thereby an increase in the degree of national security, “cannot be answered”. At the same time, the evaluations show that the public prosecutor (OM) views deprivation of Dutch nationality as an encroachment on prosecution interests. Also, deprivation of nationality does not guarantee that the person will not return: in two cases in which people whose nationality had been deprived, Turkey nevertheless unilaterally decided to deport them directly to the Netherlands.58 Despite inconclusive evaluations and criticism of the measure, a proposal was submitted to parliament in October 2021 to permanently embed the nationality deprivation powers in the law. However, after extensive debate on questions of (counter-)effectiveness, necessity and proportionality of the measure, as well as its effect on national and international security, parliament decided that the power would not to be made permanent. Instead, the power is extended for another five years and made subject to further evaluations, as well as CTIVD supervision.59 This will ensure continued scrutiny of the controversial powers and their use. 4.5. HOW HAVE DEPRIVATION POWERS BEEN USED IN PRACTICE SINCE 2000? There has yet to be a comprehensive study of how often nationality deprivation powers have been used globally as a national security measure. Publicly available data that could offer an insight into state practice is scarce. Few governments issue information on the use of these powers and reporting by the press tends to be tied to specific announcements of deprivation decisions or focused on a select number of individual cases that have gained notoriety. It is therefore difficult to discern what the full extent of the application of deprivation powers is. It goes beyond the scope of this report to attempt to fill this data gap. However, what data could be readily identified is compiled in the black box. Note that these figures have been extracted from an array of different (types of) sources and were issued at different times, and therefore may not represent the full picture for each country. Nevertheless, the data suggests that, in practice, nationality deprivation powers have been deployed against a relatively small number of citizens. Only in Bahrain60 and the United Kingdom61 do the numbers reported exceed more than a few dozen people – often even less. For many of the countries where powers were introduced or expanded since 2000, there do not (yet) appear to be any reports of deprivation cases – despite the fact that some of these reforms were passed with considerable political fanfare as a ‘show of strength’ in the fight against international terrorism. Moreover, several of the countries that introduced deprivation powers specifically in the context of concerns about how to respond to citizens traveling to Syria or Iraq to join ISIS subsequently refrained from using them in practice, instead adopting other policies towards these ‘foreign fighters’. This is apparent in Central Asia, identified as “the third biggest source of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, and if the outflow is calculated per capita, based on ICSR report data, it is comparable to that of the largest contributors such as Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia”.72 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan all introduced deprivation powers into their laws between 2015-2017. All of these states were initially focused on protecting against the perceived threat of returning ‘foreign fighters’. Kyrgyzstan even held a referendum to reform its constitution in order to pave the way for the introduction of this measure. However, there was subsequently a policy 434 BAHRAIN62 212 UK63 60 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES64 52 BELGIUM65 21 NETHERLANDS66 16 FRANCE67 12 AUSTRALIA68 6 DENMARK69 2 ESTONIA70 1 AUSTRIA71 29