2023] SPECTER OF STATELESSNESS 339 Further, the plight of island climate migrants underscores longstanding international governance gaps addressing refugees fleeing environmental disaster. The law of statelessness does not apply to climate refugees, or “environmentally displaced persons” in the terminology of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees.46 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Refugee Protocol are also silent on migrants fleeing environmental disaster.47 Under international law, protected refugee status may be granted for reasons of persecution (e.g. race, nationality, or membership of a particular social group).48 Environmental migrants fleeing their homeland would not fall under this refugee conception.49 In addition, the Framework Convention and follow-on accords do not provide legal protections for climate migrants fleeing environmental or imminent climate disaster.50 Although the U.N. General Assembly recently recognized the right to a healthy human environment in 2022, it remains to be seen how this new right is actualized.51 In the interim, environmentally displaced persons lack clear, legally cognizable protections under international law.52 Relatedly, at the urging of the Republic of Vanautu (a small island nation in the Pacific) in March 2023 the U.N. General Assembly voted to request that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issue an advisory opinion addressing the 46. U.N. High Commission for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the Status of Refugees, at 9 (2011); Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Person in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change Volume I (2015); see also Stewart, supra note 2, at 32–33. 47. See Philip Dane Warren, Note, Evaluating Climate Change Displacement, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2103, 2109–10 (2017); Amhimyanhu George Jain, The 21st Century Atlantis: The International Law of Statehood and Climate Change-Induced Loss of Territory, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (arguing that the political realities of recognition will operate to ensure the continuing statehood of these small island nations). 48. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, ¶ (A)(2), Jul. 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 49. See Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, at ¶ 2.8 (Sep. 23, 2020). 50. For a discussion of a possible role for the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in providing a relevant legal framework for environmentally displaced persons, see Michel Rouleau-Dick, Sea Level Rise and Climate Statelessness: From ‘Too Little Too Late’ to Context-Based Relevance, 3 STATELESSNESS & CITIZENSHIP REV. 287, 289-92 (2021). In other contexts, the Security Council has acknowledged the role that refugees can play in a deteriorating security situation. See S. C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998) (recognizing the massive flow of refugees contributed to a deteriorating security situation in Kosovo). 51. G.A. Res. 76/300 (Jul. 28, 2022) (recalling the Human Rights Council recognized the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a human right). 52. There is an ongoing debate about the proper terminology to describe people displaced by climate change. Possibilities include environmental refugees, climate refugees, and climate migrants. I prefer “climate migrants” as it best captures the numerous climate-driven reasons people might flee their homeland. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4223806