in which their lives or freedoms may be threatened. No reservations are permitted to Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which prescribes non-refoulement, but the principle is broader than Article 33. Non-refoulement also is prohibited under other human rights law, including Article 3 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment240 and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,241 as well as customary international law.242 Persons meeting the refugee definition, whether under Article 1A(1), Article 1A(2) or Article 1D(2), as well as others whose return to their country of origin would violate international law, are entitled to this fundamental right of non-refoulement. The principle also applies while a person is seeking asylum, i.e., prior to recognition of refugee status or until it is established that the applicant does not fulfill the refugee definition.243 1.1.1. Non-refoulement through Time and Temporary Protection “Non-refoulement through time” is a concept located between states’ obligation of non-refoulement and states’ discretion in granting asylum. Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam explain this as follows: However labelled, the concept of temporary refuge/temporary protection as the practical consequence of non-refoulement through time provides, first, the necessary theoretical nexus between the admission of refugees and the attainment of a lasting solution. It establishes, a priori, no hierarchy in the field of solutions, but allows a pragmatic, flexible, yet principled approach to the idiosyncrasies of each situation. So, for example, it does not rule out the 240 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 39/46 - Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [Annex],” December 10, 1984, UN Doc. A/RES/39/46, http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/39/46, Article 3. 241 UN General Assembly, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Article 7. 242 See, e.g., UNHCR, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93,” January 31, 1994, http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html; and UNHCR, “UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement,” November 1997, http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html. See also Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 285–286, 302–303, 345–354, rejecting the arguments of James Hathaway that non-refoulement does not constitute customary international law. In addition, UNHCR has argued that the principle of non-refoulement has been progressively acquiring the character of peremptory law (jus cogens), i.e., a norm from which no derogation is permitted. See, e.g., UNHCR, “Executive Committee Conclusion No. 25 (XXXIII) - General Conclusion on International Protection,” October 20, 1982, para. b, http://www.unhcr. org/3ae68c434c.html; and UNHCR, “Note on International Protection (submitted by the High Commissioner),” August 3, 1987, para. 21 and 23, A/AC.96/694, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c0314. html. 243 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 232–267. See also UNHCR, “Executive Committee Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII) – Non-Refoulement,” October 12, 1977, http://www.unhcr. org/3ae68c43ac.html; UNHCR, “Executive Committee Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner) - Twenty-Eighth Session, Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection,” August 23, 1977, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68ccd10.html. The 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 1D 45