A/HRC/46/36 harsh impact of material support to terrorism laws, the operating space can fundamentally freeze the work of those actors. Additionally, counter-terrorism financing measures have been observably used to penalize family members for de minimis support and, in some cases, even when the conditions of the financial need had been caused by government detention or repatriation policies. 52 Counter-terrorism financing measures with provisions on material support to terrorism being targeted at traditional practices of family support has undermined families and directly affected the economic and social rights of family members, including children. Notably, women may even have less access to information, have limited knowledge of a spouse’s or family member’s activity or may not be able to challenge such behaviour even if it is known.53 Examples include families sending small amounts of money to women and children in camps in the Syrian Arab Republic and relatives of detainees sending money through appropriate government ministries to a listed individual, and, as noted in the following section, the expanding use of sanctions has a profound and increasing impact on the rights of family members of those whose assets are frozen.54 14. Over the past 30 years, the use of sanctions regimes has become increasingly common in national, regional and international practice.55 Sanctions have enabled the Security Council to “elastically” reinterpret “threats to international peace and security capable of justifying Council intervention … with sanctions imposed for promoting human rights, restoring democratic leadership and furthering arms control” – a key enabling factor for the United Nations global governance of counter-terrorism.56 Sanctions regimes have consolidated and expanded beyond recognition in the post-11 September 2001 counter-terrorism arena. That locus can be pinpointed to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) requiring States to freeze funds and other financial resources directly belonging to, or indirectly benefitting, the Taliban. The regime was broadened to include Al-Qaida and persons associated with Osama bin Laden by Council resolution 1333 (2000). It was extended to target Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by resolution 2253 (2015). Sanctions are global in scope and potentially limitless in duration. 57 Holders of this mandate have consistently articulated concerns that terrorism sanctions are applied both as a result of allegedly criminal conduct and as a purely preventative measure.58 Sanctions function as a pre-emptive legal power, with few meaningful legal constraints and limited oversight, and constitute an exercise of unprecedented supranational power. The basis upon which persons are subjected to the most invasive human rights violations are secret; data are collected primarily by intelligence entities, most of whom operate without independent oversight; and, in respect of both United Nations and national processes, no comprehensive remedies exist for the individual, despite hearty political protestations to the contrary. Security Council resolution 2560 (2020), while paying welcome attention to the rules and procedures regulating sanctions, does not resolve the weighty legal concerns surrounding them. Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic, “Families in the crosshairs: a human rights analysis of the Netherlands’ national security policy”, submission to the Special Rapporteur (2020). 53 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Note on the Shanghai Convention”, para. 69, citing the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Handbook on gender dimensions of criminal justice responses to terrorism”. 54 Ibid. 55 Gavin Sullivan, The Law of the List: UN Counterterrorism Sanctions and the Politics of Global Security Law (Cambridge University Press, 2020). During the first 45 years of the existence of the United Nations, sanctions were only imposed twice (Security Council resolutions 232 (1966) (Southern Rhodesia) and 418 (1977) (South Africa)). See also European Union, action plan on human rights and democracy, 2020–2024, para. 1.6 (a). 56 Ibid. 57 See Security Council resolution 1390 (2002). 58 According to the guidelines for the conduct of the work of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, a criminal charge or conviction is not a prerequisite for listing as the sanctions are intended to be preventive in nature (para. 6 (d)). See also A/61/267, para. 31. 52 8