Australia’s Extraterritorial Border Control Policies 61 resettled in Australia. Instead, asylum seekers would be sent to Nauru or Manus Island, and then, following the confirmation of refugee status, would either be expected to resettle in Nauru, Papua New Guinea, or a third country. Australia has, however, found it difficult to resettle refugees from Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Cambodia agreed to resettle refugees from Nauru in exchange for $55 million from the Australian Government. Only seven refugees agreed to participate in the arrangement.29 A highly publicized deal with the United States has also resulted in the resettlement of refugees from Nauru and Papua New Guinea.30 As of August 22, 2019, a total of 619 refugees had been resettled in the United States.31 An offer by New Zealand to resettle refugees from Australia’s extraterritorial detention centers has been rejected by the Australian government.32 The Australian government fears that the refugees resettled in New Zealand may be able to enter Australia later as a result of a special category visa for New Zealand citizens, which allows them to live and work in Australia indefinitely.33 Between August 13, 2012, and September 1, 2019, 4,177 people were transferred to Nauru and Papua New Guinea, including children. In September 2019, 562 of the people transferred by Australia to Nauru and Papua New Guinea remained on the islands. No children remain on Nauru and Manus Island as of January 2020. The cost of operating detention facilities in Nauru and Manus Island are borne entirely by Australia. Australia has contracted service providers and maintains a visible and active presence at the centers at all times. As the UNHCR notes, “it is clear that Australia has retained a high degree of control and direction in almost all aspects of the bilateral transfer arrangements.”34 The High Court of Australia has found that Australia secures, funds, and participates in the detention on Nauru, with Justice Bell further arguing that “[t]he Commonwealth funded the RPC and exercised effective control over the detention of the transferees through the contractual obligations it imposed on Transfield . . .. [D]etention in Nauru was, as a M. Walden, “Cambodia: Syrian Refugee Secretly Arrives from Australian Detention on Nauru,” Asian Correspondent, May 26, 2017, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2017/05/cambo dia-syrian-refugee-secretly-arrives-australian-detention-nauru/. 30 C. Packham, “Exclusive: Australia to Accept First Central American Refugees under U.S. Deal – Sources,” Reuters, July 25, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-australia-refu gees-idUSKBN1AA0NO. 31 H. Davidson, “Manus and Nauru Refugees in Australia on Medical Grounds Can Apply for US Move,” The Guardian, September 6, 2019, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/06/ manus-and-nauru-refugees-in-australia-on-medical-grounds-can-apply-for-us-move. 32 K. Murphy, “Jacinda Ardern Tells Scott Morrison New Zealand Remains Open to Resettling Nauru Refugees,” The Guardian, December 5, 2019, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ 2019/dec/05/jacinda-ardern-tells-scott-morrison-new-zealand-remains-open-to-resettling-naururefugees. 33 Ibid. 34 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Monitoring Visit to the Republic of Nauru 7–9 October 2013 (November 26, 2013), p. 23 } 128, www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/ 58117b931/unhcr-monitoring-visit-to-the-republic-of-nauru-7-to-9-october-2013.html. 29 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108914994 Published online by Cambridge University Press