14 Molly Land, Kathryn Libal, and Jillian Chambers These cases – and the judicial system’s response to individual defiance of unjust laws – illustrate not only the possibility of other ways of expressing rights outside of citizenship but also the risks that insistence on policing these boundaries could pose for the legitimacy of the constitutional order. In this way, Kanstroom’s chapter is in dialogue with the arguments of Tendayi Bloom, who later in the volume argues that the state’s legitimacy derives not just from its accountability to its citizens, but also the extent to which it attends to its relationships with and thus its obligations to noncitizens. Kanstroom similarly argues, “Since legitimate lawmaking both responds to and generates communicative power from, as it were, below, noncitizens play a central role in translating communicative power into administrative power and law.” The third chapter in this part, Chapter 9 by Serena Parekh, “Do Non-citizens Have a Right to Have Economic Rights? Locke, Smith, Hayek, and Arendt on Economic Rights,” explores the idea of economic rights and the ability to meaningfully participate in the economy as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of human rights. Parekh begins by re-reading Locke, Smith, and Hayek, arguing that these scholars – known best for their defenses of the free market – in fact anticipated involvement of the state in the market in order to ensure individual equality and minimum economic guarantees. Focusing on the experiences of individuals who are present within a country but unable to participate in the market because they lack work authorization (as opposed to those outside of a country seeking admission), Parekh then argues that Arendt’s ideas about the need for a “right to have rights”43 can be extended to participation in the market. Parekh flips the usual neoliberal conception of economic citizenship in which individuals voice their opinions through participation in the market and the mechanism of consumer choice.44 According to Parekh, economic rights are not a manifestation of citizenship, but its precursor. Parekh argues, echoing Arendt, that “being human is not enough to have one’s economic rights protected.” Instead, “non-citizens need a right to have economic rights, that is, a right to belong to an economic community.” Whether or not one can actually enjoy human rights has less to do with one’s citizenship than one’s place in the global economy. Chapter 10 makes an explicit claim for rights based on non-citizenship. In “Human Rights Are Not Enough: Understanding Noncitizenship and Noncitizens in Their Own Right,” Tendayi Bloom argues in favor of the concept of “noncitizen” rights. Rather than seeing citizenship as the sole foundational relationship between an individual and a state and non-citizenship as its absence, she contends that there is another foundational relationship, that of non-citizenship. Moreover, this 43 H. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (2nd ed., New York: Harcourt, 1978); see also S. DeGoyer et al., The Right to Have Rights (London: Verso, 2018). 44 K. A. Faulk, “Solidarity and Accountability: Rethinking Citizenship and Human Rights,” in Goodale (ed.), Human Rights at the Crossroads, pp. 98, 102. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108914994 Published online by Cambridge University Press