with other States, as evidence of statehood.28 These criteria are generally accepted as representing customary international law.29 Additional criteria have been considered at times, although they are not examined further here.30 There is general agreement that one of the key requirements for statehood is the existence of a territory. A territory should consist of a natural surface of the earth, although man-made formations consisting of artificially reclaimed parts of the seashore which had been submerged could be considered part of a State’s territory.31 Shaw notes that ‘the relevant framework revolves essentially around territorial effectiveness’.32 Crawford agrees that ‘the State must consist of a certain coherent territory effectively governed’, although he emphasizes that there are no requirements as to size or contiguity and borders.33 The requirements for statehood are interlinked. Thus, the criterion of ‘permanent population’ should be understood as linked to that of territory which it should inhabit and where it should form a stable community.34 The population must be residing on the territory of the State,35 and Shaw considers that ‘a nomadic population might thus not count for the purposes of territorial sovereignty’.36 A large number of nomads moving in and out of the territory do not affect statehood, however, as long as there are a significant number of permanent inhabitants.37 As for the government, in principle it should be effectively in control of its territory and population. The requirement of an ‘effective government might be regarded as central to its claim to statehood’,38 although in certain circumstances this criterion is less strictly applied.39 While noting that ‘a foundation of effective control is required for statehood’,40 28 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19, signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933, entered into force, 26 December 1934. 29 See, for example, Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission), Opinion No. 1, (1992) 3 EJIL 182-183. 30 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn., Oxford: OUP, 2003) 70-76; Crawford, note 27 above, 45-62. Georg Jellinek’s ‘Drei-Elementen-Lehre’ relies on the first three elements only, that is territory, population and government; see P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn., London/New York: Routledge, 1998) 75. 31 In re Duchy of Sealand Administrative Court of Cologne, 3 May 1978, International Law Reports, Vol. 80, 1989, 684-685. 32 M. N. Shaw, International Law, (6th edn., Cambridge: CUP, 2008) 199, 960. 33 See Crawford, note 27 above, 43-52. He suggests that the lack of absoluteness makes ‘the requirement of territory (...) a constituent of government and independence rather than a distinct criterion of its own’; ibid., 52. 34 Brownlie, note 30 above, 70. Malanczuk, note 30 above, agrees and notes that this ‘constitutes the physical basis for the existence of a state’. 35 Crawford, note 27 above, 53. 36 Shaw, note 32 above, 199. 37 Malanczuk, note 30 above, 76. 38 Crawford, note 27 above, 55. 39 One such example is Congo, which could not be considered to have an effective government but had full rights to exercise all authority. A stricter test was applied for Finland, which was still engaged in a civil war with foreign involvement. See Crawford, note 27 above, 55-61. Brownlie also underlines that States have been recognized when the government was still not really effective, Brownlie, note 30 above, 71, such as for Poland, Rwanda and Burundi and concludes that, in certain cases, it is ‘either unnecessary or insufficient to support statehood.’ 40 Shaw, note 32 above, 201. 5