162 marinai indefinitely, and only grounds of national security or public order could lead to his or her removal from the national territory.19 By contrast, no such safeguards exist when the stateless person is unlawfully on the territory of the State. It is undoubtedly an element of weakness in the Convention regime that it does not oblige States to grant a legal stay to a stateless person (both before and after their status of statelessness has been recognized). The consequence is that a stateless person risks remaining in a legal limbo, bounced from one State to another, until one State recognizes his or her lawful presence.20 This issue is not taken into account by the judgment here commented. The Italian Corte di Cassazione merely set aside the decision of the Giudice di Pace di Brescia and referred the case back to another trial court for the determination of statelessness. This is certainly a necessary prerequisite before verifying the applicable rules on expulsion. However, what is not convincing about the decision of the Corte di Cassazione is the reference made to de facto statelessness. Although this reference was not decisive for the resolution of the case, the affirmation of the impossibility of extending the prohibition on expulsion to de facto stateless persons marks a potential step backwards in relation to the protection provided by the Corte di Cassazione in its previous case law. 19 20 See Robinson, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Its History and Interpretation, Commentary on Art. 31, 1955 (reprinted by the Department of International Protection, unhcr, 1997), p. 60 ff. See van Waas, cit. supra note 7, pp. 249–250. The Italian Review of International and Comparative Law 2 (2022) 154–162