142 C. SANDELOWSKY-BOSMAN AND T. LIEFAARD or who have the right to acquire Dutch nationality have the right to return.4 They would have to report to a Dutch representation in the region where they find themselves, such as the one located in Erbil (Iraq) or Ankara (Turkey).5 In 2018, the Minister of Justice and Security explained this passive policy in a letter to the Dutch House of Representatives by arguing that the Netherlands does not have ‘effective powers or authority’ in Syria, Turkey, or Iraq, and that no obligations arise under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)6 to ‘actively’ return the children.7 Although the Minister is not explicit on this, the Dutch Government seems to deny the extraterritorial application of the UNCRC in order to disavow any obligations the Netherlands might have toward these children. The passive policy of the Netherlands was stated to be further grounded in considerations related to (1) international relations (the Netherlands government has no diplomatic ties with Syria, for example), (2) the safety of those who wish to return (should the local authorities become aware of a potential warrant for arrest for the parents, they could be prosecuted in Syria which may lead to the imposition of the death sentence), and (3) the security of the Netherlands (children with fighting experience pose a threat8 and the separation of children from parents is a legally complex procedure, meaning that ‘jihadist’ parents may return to the Netherlands should the children be repatriated).9 The safety of civil servants, were they to be sent to the region for repatriating the children, was later added to the list of arguments.10 The Dutch Children’s Ombudsman, amongst others, has criticised this passive policy. She has urged the Dutch Government to take a more active role, for instance by ensuring proper shelter, care and education in the camps and making every effort to return the children.11 The Dutch Government is not alone in its passive stance. Other European countries show the same reluctance in accepting responsibilities for children from former ISISheld territories, despite the fact that some have incidentally repatriated small numbers12 June 2019) BZDOC-883556718-41. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs has emphasised that this action is not a change in the current policy line to not actively retrieve children: see ‘Minister Blok over terughalen IS-kinderen: ’Unieke situatie, beleid niet gewijzigd’ (RTL Nieuws,) 11 June 2019 <www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/politiek/artikel/4742436/minister-blokover-halen-weeskinderen-unieke-situatie-geen-nieuw> accessed 13 January 2020. 4 Dutch Minister for Legal Protection, Antwoorden Kamervragen over het artikel ‘Speciale opvang voor jihad-kinderen bij terugkeer in Nederland’ (20 September 2019) 2692716. 5 District Court The Hague, ECLI:NL:RBDH:2019:11909 (11 November 2019) 3.2. 6 The UNCRC was unanimously adopted by the United Nations on 20 November 1989. It took effect on 2 September 1990 and currently nearly all countries around the world (196) have ratified the UNCRC. On 8 March 1995, the UNCRC took effect in the Netherlands. 7 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security (n 2). 8 Also Dutch Minister for Legal Protection (n 4); NCTV (n 2). 9 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security (n 2); Parliamentary Documents II 2017–18, 29754, 461. 10 Parliamentary Documents II 2018–19, 29754, 492. These arguments were repeated recently by the Minister: Parliamentary Documents II 2019–20, Aanhangsel, 1403. 11 Letter from the Dutch Children’s Ombudsman for Children to the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security (8 January 2019) <www.dekinderombudsman.nl/system/files?file=inline/2019.01. 08briefaanministerGrapperhausinzakekindereninkampeninSyri.pdf> accessed 14 May 2020; M Kalverboer, ‘Haal de kinderen terug uit Syrië, ze hebben hulp nodig’ (NRC 15 oktober 2019); ‘Terugkeer van kwetsbare Nederlandse kinderen moet onderdeel worden van het Nederlands beleid’ (UNICEF, 18 June 2019) <www.unicef.nl/nieuws/2019-06-18-terugkeervan-kwetsbare-nederlandse-kinderen-moet-onderdeel-worden-van-het-nederlands-beleid> accessed 14 May 2020. See also The Child Justice Advocacy Group, Child Returnees Position Paper (Updated Draft November 2019) <https:// defenceforchildren.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Position-paper.pdf> accessed 14 May 2020. 12 Emma Broches, ‘What is Happening with the Foreign Women and Children in SDF Custody in Syria?’ (Lawfareblog, 24 March 2020) <www.lawfareblog.com/what-happening-foreign-women-and-children-sdf-custody-syria> accessed 14 May 2020. In 2019, Kosovo repatriated 74 children; France, 17; Sweden, 7; Belgium, 6 and Norway, 5. A handful of orphans were repatriated by Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, Finland and Denmark. The countries have avoided generalising these practices to all children who remain in the camps.