150 C. SANDELOWSKY-BOSMAN AND T. LIEFAARD responsible for the implementation of the UNCRC rights. However, it is plausible that the State Party, if the children have almost reached its border, can easily have them fall within its enforcement jurisdiction by offering them a helping hand. The position of children residing outside of their countries of origins in refugee camps was not been recognised during the drafting of the UNCRC, nor has it yet been addressed by the CRC Committee. One could argue that these children find themselves in a situation which falls within the category of ‘every possible situation’, especially if the country of origin is expected to be aware of the real threat to the children’s right to life,71 and has a certain degree of influence over their fate by designing and adhering to a passive policy, which acknowledges the link of these children to the legislative jurisdiction (or at a minimum the sphere of influence) of that country. As mentioned above, children with ties to the Netherlands in camps in the Middle East are likely to be within physical reach of the Dutch Government, especially in view of possible cooperation with other parties (the Kurds, the United States and the Red Cross),72 despite the current lack of enforcement jurisdiction. It is therefore not implausible that in spite of the lack of enforcement jurisdiction on the ground, children with ties to the Netherlands could fall within Dutch jurisdiction under UNCRC Article 2(1). Stretching the concept of jurisdiction to this specific context is not inconceivable and may be further justifiable on the basis of the fact that these children finds themselves in a de facto legal void. It would also be in line with the rationale of the UNCRC providing for the protection of a particular group of people who due to their ‘ … physical and mental immaturity, need special safeguards and care’.73 UNCRC Article 2(1) should thus not be interpreted restrictively in the sense that the exercise of jurisdiction, in the traditional, territorial and enforcement sense, is a condition for the establishment of obligations on the grounds of the UNCRC, and that government responsibilities related to this would then only apply to children within the physical jurisdiction. Arguably UNCRC rights then apply extraterritorially to the extent they can be observed. This brings us to the further clarification of the substantive rights of the child that are at stake. 4. Relevant Substantive Rights of the UNCRC 4.1. Various relevant substantive rights It is clear that the Dutch Government cannot be assumed accountable for the direct rights violations that take place in the refugee camps in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. These seem attributable to (non-)state actors that do not operate under Dutch command, or on Dutch territory. It would, however, seem relevant—should Dutch jurisdiction be accepted in this context—to examine to what extent the justification for the government’s current passive policy is in line with the requirements of UNCRC Article 3(1) (the best interests of the child) and to what extent a right to be retrieved follows from the right to return (UNCRC Article 10(1)). In addition, it can be argued that the Dutch Government would have a responsibility to protect children against rights violations committed by 71 See section 3.1 and n 46 above. See also UNCRC, art 4. One could also argue that a restrictive interpretation of jurisdiction does not fit in a globalised world in which individuals (including families and children) easily migrate from one country to the other. 73 UNCRC, Preamble. 72