700 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 105:694 reason to find fault in the nationality determinations of other states. The stability was reinforced by a natural-law superstructure that tied individuals to the perpetual allegiance of the sovereigns into whose protection they were born.22 “[O]nce a subject, always a subject.”23 Migration put substantial stresses on that order, however, as individuals sought to transfer membership from the state of origin to the state of new residence. Nationality status became the plane on which states of origin and of naturalization contested their claims. During the nineteenth century many European states refused to recognize the validity of naturalization before other sovereigns, leading to serious diplomatic disputes and, in at least one case, armed conflict.24 An understanding that international law only marginally constrained state nationality practice thus did not translate into an equilibrium. In the early years of the twentieth century, the drawbacks of state discretion in this area were broadly recognized. After decades of nationalitybased disputes between states, international law elites considered the subject to be a priority for top-down legal reform. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, nationality was the subject of discussion in various international law associations.25 As early as 1925, one commentator could observe that the “the desirability of international agreement, with a view to securing uniformity of legislation and practice, has long occupied the attention of international jurists.”26 The French Institute of International Law had considered problems of nationality from 1880 forward,27 issuing a resolution at its 1896 Venice session.28 In 1924, the International Law Association proposed a model statute with the aim of reducing both dual nationality and statelessness.29 The focus reached a new level of intensity as the League of Nations considered possible candidates for codification efforts in the mid-1920s.30 Nationality was one of only three issues (the others relating to territorial waters and state responsibility) selected in 1927 for systematic consideration at the 1930 Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law (Codification Conference).31 The exercise was understood to be one of “progressive” codification, to make law rather than merely to restate it.32 The eminent international law authority James 22 See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.). Koessler, supra note 6, at 67. 24 See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1422–23 (1997) (describing how conflicts over U.S. naturalization contributed to War of 1812). 25 See Harvard Research, supra note 9, at 39; see also id. at 118 –26 (reproducing bar association resolutions). 26 J. W. Garner, Uniformity of Law in Respect to Nationality, 19 AJIL 547, 550 (1925) (noting “regrettable situation” resulting from conflicting nationality laws). 27 Id. at 550. 28 See Institut de droit international, Résolutions relatives aux conflits de lois en matière de nationalité (1896), at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1896_ven_02_fr.pdf. 29 See Report of the Nationality and Naturalisation Committee, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 25; see also id. at 46 (statement of Arthur Kuhn: “It seems to me that we are confronted with a very acute situation internationally.”). 30 For background, see Historical Survey of Development of International Law and Its Codification by International Conferences, UN Doc. A/AC.10/5 (1947), reprinted in 41 AJIL 32, 66 (Special Supp. 1947). 31 See id., 41 AJIL at 105– 07 (reproducing League of Nations Resolution approving codification conference). 32 See id. at 107 (stating that the “spirit of the codification . . . should not confine itself to the mere registration of existing rules, but should aim at adapting them as far as possible to contemporary conditions of international life”). 23 This content downloaded from 82.196.111.31 on Thu, 07 Oct 2021 15:20:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms