742 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 105:694 in the absence of community may be thin. An international law norm that requires citizenship to be afforded on the basis of presence could thus diminish state power. In the long run, internationally mandated access to citizenship may dilute its importance and facilitate a postnational destination in which citizenship status becomes marginalized as a vehicle for protecting rights. A norm protective of dual citizenship could also undermine the strength of communities represented by the citizenship tie. On the one hand, dual citizenship reinforces the institution of the state to the extent that it facilitates expressions of national identity that were precluded in the old order, in which multiple attachments were disfavored.342 A person who has ties to more than one national community can formalize those ties through dual citizenship.343 On the other hand, protecting that dual status will tend to dilute the categorical importance of identity defined in citizenship terms. The old regime of mutual exclusivity reinforced the primacy of national identities, with the distinctions among national communities clearly drawn. Dual citizenship blurs those boundaries; identity boundaries become less clear and, as a result, less defining.344 Dual citizenship also lowers the cost of citizenship acquired or maintained for non-affective, instrumental reasons by eliminating the need to abandon citizenship representing primary community attachment. The cost of adding or maintaining citizenships is relatively low; few obligations are now contingent on the status.345 Dual citizenship facilitates the acquisition or maintenance of citizenship for such instrumental purposes as securing absolute entry rights and other immigration benefits (including protection against deportation and exclusion), insuring eligibility for social benefits, and overcoming restrictions on property rights—for which no actual attachment to the national community may be necessary. These instrumental motivations may be more pronounced in the context of naturalization, where the affective ties to the state of immigration may be thin. Acceptance of dual citizenship lowers the cost of naturalization by allowing new citizens to maintain their homeland tie (which they might otherwise be reluctant to relinquish), thereby removing an obstacle to instrumental naturalization. Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators,346 the problem of divided loyalties is a less serious concern in a world in which dual citizens are not often called to play favorites between their states of citizenship. Nevertheless, with its lower threshold for national membership, dual citizenship may render that membership less meaningful, weaken the communal bond, and diminish the state as a locus of authority. States, Germany, and Israel, in MIGRATION IN HISTORY: HUMAN MIGRATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 201 (Marc S. Rodriguez & Anthony Grafton eds., 2007). 342 See Bosniak, supra note 120, at 979. 343 Not that all or even most of them do, at least when the individual eligible for additional citizenship is required to undertake an affirmative act. When Mexico in 1998 made possible the restoration of citizenship for the hundreds of thousands who had previously lost it by naturalizing in the United States, only sixty-seven thousand availed themselves of the offer in the initial five-year window. See DAVID FITZGERALD, A NATION OF EMIGRANTS: HOW MEXICO MANAGES ITS MIGRATION 161 (2009). Now, however, dual citizenship is the default position of naturalizing immigrants, who retain their original citizenship while acquiring a new one. 344 See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Citizenship: A Postnational View, in DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 4, at 189. 345 See supra text accompanying note 272. 346 See GEYER, supra note 74; RENSHON, supra note 285. This content downloaded from 82.196.111.31 on Thu, 07 Oct 2021 15:20:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms