2011] AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 703 desired to renounce;49 in other words, expatriation would be available to those who acquired dual nationality at birth but not to those coming to that status through naturalization. The treaty did address the more extreme consequences of sex discrimination, so that a woman would not end up stateless by marrying a foreigner,50 and it also remedied situations giving rise to the statelessness of children.51 But the core of sovereign discretion was undisturbed. Scott lamented that “the caption” itself was “illuminating”; the convention considered the problem as one of conflicts and not of international law.52 Even in the face of this light touch, the convention was not widely adopted, garnering only twelve ratifications.53 Nonetheless, the treaty lay the groundwork for some constraint on nationality practice. “While the direct and immediate effect of these Agreements was not great,” observed one subsequent commentator on nationality law, “their indirect significance is considerable.”54 The exercise had focused attention on state practice and aired possible solutions to difficulties created by the diversity of approaches to nationality. Although the Hague conference highlighted the formidable “political obstacles” to securing state agreement to legal limitation on their nationality practices and reaffirmed the premise of sovereign state discretion,55 it opened the door to the emergence of international norms on nationality. Middle-Era Feints From the Hague Conference, one can trace the development of four discrete international regimes relating to nationality: diplomatic protection, expatriation, statelessness, and discrimination against women. Practices relating to diplomatic protection and expatriation helped to reduce bilateral frictions arising from nationality practice, but they governed nationality only to the extent that its attribution infringed on the rights of other states (in other words, as a matter of conflict of laws). Although a priority issue in the wake of World War II and for the first time framing citizenship as a right, the regime against statelessness constrained the practice of particular states in only minor respects. The establishment of international norms against sex discrimination also presented a rights frame for citizenship practice, one more practically 49 Hague Convention on Nationality, supra note 16, Art. 6; see also Flournoy, Nationality Convention, supra note 35, at 472 (“Since the article places no limitation upon these ‘conditions,’ presumably the state in question may make them as drastic, difficult and unreasonable as it may choose.”). 50 Hague Convention on Nationality, supra note 16, Arts. 8 –9. 51 Id., Arts. 13–16. As Rundstein noted, these mechanisms addressed cases “so rare that [a solution] would not be likely to encounter political obstacles.” League of Nations Experts Committee, supra note 13, at 30. 52 SCOTT, supra note 34, at 65– 66; see also Donner, supra note 48, at 67 (noting that “[c]riticism of the Convention and characterization of it as a failure was widespread”). 53 See Hague Convention on Nationality, supra note 16; see also Hudson Report on Nationality, supra note 17, at 7 (results of the Hague Conference “were relatively modest”). 54 WEIS, supra note 13, at 31; see also Flournoy, Nationality Convention, supra note 35, at 484 (discussions surrounding the Convention “served to bring out in sharp relief the position of the various states with regard to important problems”). 55 Rundstein repeatedly used the phrase in discounting the possibilities for broad agreement. See League of Nations Experts Committee, supra note 13, at 25 (highlighting political aspects of nationality questions; “[n]o solution can be hoped for where there is the slightest suspicion that the problem is of a political nature”), 30, 34; see also WEIS, supra note 13, at 90 (noting as obstacle to development of international law in the area “the frequently noticeable tendency of States to uphold, for political reasons, their own law even if it is at variance with that of the majority of States”); Flournoy, Nationality Convention, supra note 35, at 467 (“There is one point which has been stressed by nearly every one who has discussed the inclusion of nationality in the codification of international law, . . . that is, that this subject is especially difficult because of the fact that it is to a great extent ‘political.’”). This content downloaded from 82.196.111.31 on Thu, 07 Oct 2021 15:20:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms