Peoples’ Right to a Nationality answer to African political problems of neo-colonialism, foreign domination and the bloc policy. 28 The Banjul Charter adopted by the OAU remained in force until the inception of the African Union in 2002. Under the OAU, a distinct African human right system was progressively put in place as Protocols to the Banjul Charter, which included the 1987 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and the 1990 African Charter for the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Since then, the AUled African human rights system has been improved with the previously mentioned instruments based on the Banjul Charter: the 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, the 2004 Protocol on the African Court of Justice, the 2009 Kampala Convention and the 2018 AU Protocol on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa. However, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Charter is the absence of the right to nationality, which could be enjoyed at individual, group and collective levels. There has been explicit structural discrimination, not only against individuals, but also against whole communities and ethnic groups who constitute people protected by arts 19–24 of the 1981 Banjul Charter. This gap has been conspicuous due to violations of individual rights to nationality for political reasons in the continent. 29 More importantly, there have also been instances of collective denial, deprivation and discrimination against specific communities, groups and peoples in the continent, leading to mass statelessness. 30 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS IN AFRICA As a framework of analysis, the study will examine the various concepts and theories related to the right to nationality. It will also clarify and highlight the differences in the use of collective and group rights terms such as the ‘communality’ and ‘solidarity rights’, minority and indigenous rights, community and peoples’ rights, peoples’ nationality rights, and nationality and statelessness. A Communality and Solidarity Rights Ronald Garet, for instance, has developed a model to categorise and differentiate fundamental rights into three, based on ‘personhood, communality and sociality’. 31 According to him, personhood is the ground for individual rights whose objective is self-achievement. Communality, on the other hand, is the ground for rights of groups to maintain themselves and to pursue their distinctive course. 32 Finally, sociality is the ground for the right of the existence of states and other artificial groupings created by humankind. 33 The protection of collective 28 29 30 31 32 33 See Keba M’baye, ‘Le droit au développement comme droit de l’homme’ (1972) 5(2–3) Revue Des Droits de l’Homme 503. There are many instances on these violations. One popular example is the deprivation of Kenneth Kuanda’s nationality. On this case and the repercussions, see Georges NzongolaNtalaja, ‘Citizenship, Political Violence and Democratization in Africa (2004) 10(4) Global Governance 403. See, eg, Lisa Schlein, ‘Mass Expulsion of Congolese from Angola Could Spark Humanitarian Crisis’, VOA News (online, 16 October 2018) <https://www.voanews.com/africa/massexpulsion-congolese-angola-could-spark-humanitarian-crisis>. Ronald Garet, ‘Communality and Existence: The Right of Groups’ (1983) 56 (5) Southern California Law Review 1001, 1016. ibid 1002. ibid 1008–9. 39