FLUX: International Relations Review T he struggle of Kurdish women at large has been, as many media outlets suggest, an extraordinary and unique example of women's status in the Middle East (Şimşek & Jongerden, 2018, 1). However, the so-called "empowerment" of Kurdish women has not been universal as many Kurdish women still experience violence, discrimination, and subordination due to one or more identities that they hold. Behind the surface-level narrative of Kurdish women's empowerment lies the complex political, social, and historical backdrop of Kurdish statelessness, contributing to Kurdish women's varying statuses today. Stateless people may be defined as those who lack "effective nationality" and are prohibited from enjoying the rights associated with citizenship (UNHCR 2000). The Kurdish people, an ethnic minority of about 25 million, are one of the largest stateless populations in the world (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019, 1). In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne established present-day Turkey across what would have been the borders of an autonomous Kurdistan (Who Are the Kurds? BBC News, 2019, 2). The Treaty left the Kurdish people with minority status in the four main countries in which they reside: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Zadeh, 2018, 1). Within these four main countries, the experience of Kurdish people, and Kurdish women, more specifically, vary widely due to different experiences in statelessness. The ways in which statelessness has impacted the status of Kurdish women may be loosely categorized into two primary paths: "double revolution" and "double oppression." A double revolution describes the advancement of Kurdish women, wherein the stateless population's agenda and the feminist agenda are complimentary and can develop in ways that would have been impossible on their own. For Kurdish women, a double revolution leads to greater feminist freedoms and rights in conjunction with greater national autonomy as a stateless Kurd. Double oppression describes the intersectional way in which Kurdish women may experience gender-based discrimination in conjunction with discrimination against their Kurdish identity. For Kurdish women, double oppression entails increased 10 gender-based oppression and violence, exacerbated by unique characteristics of Kurds' stateless status. Kurdish populations across the Middle East face a spectrum of challenges that mainly depend on their location and relationship with the state or group controlling the area where they reside. As a result of these circumstances, this essay will focus on the Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq as distinct populations. In Syria, approximately 300,000 Kurds have been granted Syrian citizenship since the 1960s (Avenue et al., 2009, 10). Under the guise of land reform and redistribution, land traditionally controlled by Kurdish populations within Syrian borders has been systematically redistributed to their Arab-majority neighbours (Avenue et al., 2009, 10). In conjunction with revoking Kurds' Syrian citizenship, this act is a part of a larger trend to culturally oppress, politically alienate, and systematically deny Kurds fundamental human rights within Syria's borders (Avenue et al., 2009, 11). Most Kurds in Syria are geographically situated between territory controlled by the brutal al-Assad regime and the neighbouring Turkish border, escaping the violence of the Syrian Civil War and associated violent conflict nearly impossible. Syrian Kurds' proximity to Turkey has also led to an exchange of leftist ideology and values from Turkey-based Kurdish forces to Syria-based forces (Federici, 2015, 83). Even so, Syrian Kurds have established relative autonomy in the northeastern region of Syria (Federici, 2015, 82). This province, called Rojava, is within Syria but is mainly under Kurdish control. Some displaced Kurds have attempted to cross Semalka, the closest international border crossing in the area, and enter Kurdish-controlled Iraqi territory. Across Semalka, Kurds of Iraq face a very different reality than their Syrian counterparts. Without the influence of Turkey-based Kurdish forces, Iraqi Kurdish movements are more defined by tribal loyalties and patrimonialism (Owtram, 2018, 305). For example, between 1994-1998, Iraqi Kurdistan was the site of a civil war between two regionally based major parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (Joly & Bakawan, 2016, 957). However, like Syrian Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurds have also suffered enormous losses at the hands of the states, imposing on their semi-autonomous territory (Joly & Bakawan, 2016, 960). In the last 20th century, Saddam Hussein's regime exerted brutal, even genocidal, violent control over Kurdish populations in Iraq (Joly & Bakawan, 2016, 965). However, even after Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown, Iraqi Kurds have also been impacted by international forces, such as the United States, Soviet Union, and ISIS, competing for oil revenues and territorial control (Owtram, 2018, 307). In each of these regions of historical Kurdistan, several features of statelessness make it so that Kurdish women may experience diminished agency or increased agency due to their stateless status. Statelessness is not a direct catalyst for feminist revolution or oppressive marginalization. Instead, unique conditions of women's statelessness have the potential to intensify women's empowerment or marginalization. This essay will demonstrate how nationalist ideology, autonomous spaces, and violent conflict may provide the conditions for a "double revolution" or 'double oppression' of stateless women through the lens of statelessness. These three features of statelessness intersect with the unique features of the stateless Kurdish population at hand to determine a woman's status. More specifically, the case of Syrian Kurdistan exemplifies a 'double revolution' while Iraqi Kurdistan exemplifies a 'double oppression' for Kurdish women. This essay will examine how features of statelessness may pave the way for Kurdish women to undergo both a 'double revolution' or 'double oppression' depending on the circumstances. Nationalist Ideology Nationalist ideology has long been a feature of many stateless populations. Kurdish nationalist ideology varies drastically across the four primary states of Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, in which Kurdish populations live. These points of divergence help to explain differences in the status of women across these Kurdish populations. Aspirations for an autonomous nation-state are typically the foundation of nationalist ideology; both stateless and non-stateless populations may be invested in nationalist ideology. Nationalist ideology can develop a genuine mutualism with feminist goals as status quos become more malleable through nationalist uprising; simultaneously, nationalist ideology may superficially subscribe to a feminist agenda to benefit ulterior goals. Additionally, there is a plethora of literature that describes and analyzes how nationalist movements reproduce patriarchal societal patterns and harm women (O'Keefe 2013, 1). For Kurds in Syria, nationalist ideology embodies leftist ideas, namely those of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, that have been exchanged across the Syrian-Turkish border. Conversely, in Iraqi-Kurdistan, Kurdish nationalist ideology has been divided and, consequently, weakened by divisions across political and social cleavages. Research on statelessness is more focused on how nationalism harms women than how it may benefit women (O'Keefe 2013, 2). There is merit to this perspective as nationalist movements tend to rely on traditional gender norms and hierarchies to construct and develop a new, formal nation (O'Keefe 2013, 2). For example, the notion of the woman as a mother is often intensely amplified through and for nationalist ideology. Women are put on pedestals for advancing the nationalist cause as the biological reproducers of the nation (Brennan, 2019, 171). Unfortunately, this framing only serves nationalist ideology while diminishing women's roles in society to solely being reproductive agents, limiting their ability to live outside this role (O'Keefe 2013, 4). Additionally, it is essential to note that Kurdish nationalists have also been accused of perversely promoting an image of Kurdish women as freer than their Persian, Turkish, and Arab counterparts to emphasize Kurdish exceptionalism and their nationalist agenda (Bengio 2016, 1). In her book on Iraq's genocidal Anfal Campaign (1986–1989) against the Kurds, Choman Hardi claims that nationalist leaders sought to advance their cause cause by leveraging Kurdish women's emotional injuries—from wartime rape and abductions orchestrated by Arab men—to gain political momentum (Bengio 2016, 1). In this 11