Digital ID and Risk of Statelessness collected during registration of persons and creates NIIMS as a central link to government services and some private services (notably banking and telecommunications) through digital ID. NIIMS also centralises the administrative work of issuing identity documents. This centralisation effectively shifts aspects of government services from their respective departments to the identity department, housed at the Ministry of Interior. NIIMS was, under the enabling law, authorised to collect DNA and GPS data on each person, although collection of these two forms of data was halted by the court in an interim judgement. 5 The same judgement allowed NIIMS to proceed with collecting other forms of identity data, however. 6 The judgement arose from petitions challenging the design of NIIMS as a mandatory precondition for access to government services. Petitioners contested the lack of privacy and data protection, opacity in the technology behind the system and the lack of public participation in developing the NIIMS law. 7 In the final ruling for the case, the High Court allowed the NIIMS project in principle, on the condition that ‘an appropriate and comprehensive regulatory framework’ was first enacted. 8 In response, the government in October 2020 published two sets of subsidiary regulations, popularly known as ‘Huduma Namba Regulations’. 9 These regulations pronounce the NIIMS database as the primary source of identification in Kenya, 10 and the Data Protection (Civil Registration) Regulations (‘Data Protection Law’) creates a legitimate basis for processing NIIMS data. 11 These regulations were made by the executive; thus their substance was not debated in Parliament, despite their drastic impact. A previous attempt at a comprehensive digital ID law, which was known as the Huduma Bill and would have required approval by Parliament, 12 seems to have been abandoned in favour of the regulations. Concerns about exclusion remain. Everyone residing in Kenya, including children, are required to register for the system, yet not everyone has primary identity documents such as birth certificates or national identity cards, which are required for enrolment. In May 2019, the government undertook a 45-day mass enrolment programme, where people were required to present themselves for biometric enrolment. Those people without a primary identity document could not register. The Huduma Namba Regulations do not address the plight of those who lack documents and such people are consequently at risk of statelessness. 13 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Nubian Rights Forum v Attorney-General; Child Welfare Society (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR, Consolidated Petitions No 56, 58 and 59 of 2019 (High Court of Kenya, Nairobi) [1047](I)–(II) (‘NIIMS Case’). ibid [1047](III). ibid [13]. ibid [1047](III). The two regulations are the Registration of Persons (National Integrated Identity Management System) Rules (2020) Kenya Gazette Supplement No 176, Legal Notice No 195 (Republic of Kenya) (‘Registration of Persons Rules’); Data Protection (Civil Registration) Regulations (2020) (Republic of Kenya) (‘Data Protection Regulations’). Registration of Persons Rules (n 9) r 10. Data Protection Regulations (n 9) reg 4. Draft Huduma Bill (2019) (Republic of Kenya). Christine Mungai, ‘Kenya’s Huduma: Data Commodification and Government Tyranny’, Al Jazeera (online, 6 August 2019) <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/kenyahuduma-data-commodification-government-tyranny-190806134307370.html>. 349