presumption. Specifically, some authorities have concluded that (UNGA resolutions on point create a rebuttable presumption that the rule exists.28 This practice is not only borne out in the jurisprudence of international tribunals, but also in state practice. Both Germany and the Netherlands very directly submitted to the ILC that decisions on points of customary international law by international organizations are readily accepted as proof of the law.29 That being said, a more conservative approach would follow that of the STL: evidence of significant t international concern with some evidence of concordant practice should result in a presumption that a rule exists under customary international law. One question is whether this practice is really establishing a presumption rather than the usual evidentiary weighing. If we look at the way that these alternatives are used, sometimes the statement of an authority or the UNGA is enough to satisfy the decision-maker that a norm of customary international law exists. No more concrete evidence needs to be submitted. This approach suggests that the decision-maker considered the submission (scholarly opinion, UNGA res., etc.) and presumed that the norm existed, holding off on the final decision on the law to provide an opportunity for evidence of divergent practice or other evidence that would defeat the rule, before concluding that the rule exists. Because the decision is based on an approach that the rule would need evidence against it to be defeated, we can understand that the decision-maker was approaching the matter as a rebuttable presumption. This article will now complete a short case study of how this approach could be applied in practice, using the example of child statelessness. It will identify whether a proposed rule has been articulated by scholars; whether it is logical, deduced from other sources or touching on certain key values and the need for international cooperation. It will also identify whether the issue is a matter of general concern to the international community, expressed in UNGA Resolutions or the acts of other major international organizations. The existence of concordant practice will be only briefly considered, because an exhaustive survey of practice would go beyond the step of a presumption to consider whether there is any sustained practice that would rebut the presumption. An exhaustive survey will be studied another day, and will be justified if the presumption can be established. 28 See Int’l L. Ass’n, Statement of Principles, princ. 29 (“Resolutions of the General Assembly expressly or impliedly asserting that a customary rule exists constitute rebuttable evidence that such is the case.”). Also see Leg. of the Thr. or Use of Nucl. Weapons, Adv. Op., (Nucl. Weapons adv. op.) 1996 ICJ Resp. 226, paras. 70-71 (July 8) (“[UNGA resolutions] can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”); J ORG E C ASTAÑED A, T HE L EGAL E FFECTS OF U NITED N ATIO NS R ESOLUTIONS 192-3 (1969) (“[T]he resolutions are binding, not in the sense that they created new obligations, but in the sense that they are the expression and the legally irrefutable proof of general principles of law that are obligatory.”). But see Voting Proc. on Qs Rela. to Reports & Petits. Concern. the Terr. of SW Afr., Adv. Op., 1955 ICJ 84 (June 7) (Klaestad, J, sep. op.); id. at 90 (Lauterpacht, J., sep. op. ) 29 See Mission of the Fed. Rep . of Germany to the UN, Practice relating to formation and evidence of customary international law 4 (undated) available at http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/sessions/66/pdfs/english/icil_germany.pdf&lang=E (“acts of bodies of international organizations, and in particular international courts deserve special attention in this context”) (citing BverfGE 96,68 [87]; 2 BvR 1506/03, para. 52; 2 BvR 1243/03, para. 50); Mission of the Kingdom of the Neths. to the UN, Information provided by The Kingdom of the Netherlands (undated) available at http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/sessions/68/pdfs/english/icil_netherlands.pdf&lang=E Thus, when a Dutch court refers to a norm of customary law, this norm is likely to have been identified as such by a reliable (international) body. The conclusions regarding the existence of a norm of custom by such a body tend to be easily accepted by the Dutch judiciary, which does not engage in a distinct identification process by itself. 5 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091912