prevent cases of statelessness during state succession.111 The ILC reached this conclusion because it found that there is a duty under international law to avoid statelessness.112 The ILC understood the stateless conventions to express norms of customary international law113 In fact, the concern over creation of situations of stateless motivated the ILC’s conclusions in the draft articles on the succession of states.114 However, the conclusions of the ILC are not always easily distinguished between the codification of customary international law and the progressive development of the law; the prohibition of statelessness may be the latter.115 In applying the rules for determining customary international law, as they are slowly emerging through practice, we find that we may have a presumption that a norm against statelessness has crystallized in international law. Firstly, statelessness is intimately linked with sovereignty which is indisputably one of those very few norms that ensure “the coexistence and vital cooperation of the members of international community”, following the reasoning of the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine case.116 Secondly, the prohibition on statelessness is also a logical deduction from the well-established rule of sovereignty, here following the deductive reasoning of the ICJ in Lotus, Fisheries Jurisdiction, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Arrest Warrant, and Jurisdictional Immunities cases. 117 Surely the prohibition of statelessness serves an important value,118 and addresses a matter of international concern. 119 Therefore, we begin our analysis of customary international law with a presumption that there is a rule prohibiting creation of statelessness, and specifically that the remedy is for states to grant their nationality to children born in their territory who would otherwise be stateless. IV. Conclusion Following this review of practice, we can presume that there is a rule on point because statelessness, especially in children, implicates issues of issues of coexistence and cooperation, features largely concordant practice, is a matter of international concern (subject of multiple UNGA and other resolutions) and is simply logical as a matter of human rights and state sovereignty. In many cases, courts and other bodies have routinely drawn the link between nationality and state of birth as being the most logical link, perhaps only short of the nationality of the parent. Subparagraph (f) provides the definition of the term “person concerned”. The Commission considers it necessary to include such a definition, since the inhabitants of the territory affected by the succession of States may include, in addition to the nationals of the predecessor State, nationals of third States and stateless persons residing in that territory on the date of the succession. 111 See id. at art. 4 (“States concerned shall take all appropriate measures to prevent persons who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State from becoming stateless as a result of such succession.”) 112 See id. at art. 4, cmty (1)-(2). 113 See id. at art. 4, cmty (2). 114 See id. at art. 4, cmty (1)-(2). 115 But see infra, where the studies of the ILC on the topic included surveys of the practice of states and were therefore more likely to be codification exercises. See ILC, II YB 1953 Add. 1, supra note 31. 116 See Gulf of Maine case, supra note 6 at para. 111; Simma & Alston, Sources, supra at 106. 117 See Lotus case, supra note 1 at 25 (“A corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas is that a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the State the flag of which it flies, for, just as in its own territory, that State exercises its authority, upon it, and no other State may do so”); Fish. Juris. Case (UK v. Ice), supra note 19 at 175; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Reps. 137, para. 10 (Van den Wyngaert, J ad hoc, diss. op.); id. para. 13 (also arguing that the Lotus principle plays a role in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence); Juris. Imms. case, supra note 19 at paras. 57, 67-72; Racke case, supra note 19 at at para. 50 (citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra note 19 at at 104). This consideration could, however, be the complementary assessment of principles of law, rather than the deduction of customary principles. In either event, the deductive reasoning process is being applied in the context of analyzing the rules of customary international law. 118 See Gulf of Maine case, supra note 6; Juris. Imms. case, supra note 19 at para. 57; Ayyash case, Interloc. Dec. on the Appl. L, supra note 20 at para. 86; Pinochet (No. 3) case, supra note 20 at paras. 56-8; ILA Statement of Principles, supra note 20. 119 See Ayyash case, Interloc. Dec. on the Appl. L, supra note 20 at para. 101. 15 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091912