2025 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 7(2) international law. 21 Additionally, practice reveals ambiguity. Kosovo’s 2008 Declaration of Independence22 was deemed to ‘not violate the international law’ by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), 23 and 118 states are claimed to recognise it. 24 Yet Kosovo’s international legal status remains disputed. 25 If recognition is purely declaratory, why does Kosovo still lack full international legal personality? And if recognition is constitutive, how many states must recognise a new entity for it to be considered a state? These questions show that recognition — particularly by powerful states or those involved in sovereignty disputes — continue to shape the legal contours of statehood. Another key challenge to Taiwan’s statehood as noted by international law scholars is its lack of a formal declaration of independence.26 In contrast, Brad Roth interprets Taiwan’s lack of a formal declaration of independence as the most expedient strategy for both the Taiwanese population and the international community. 27 While the Taiwanese people seek to protect themselves from potential military aggression from the PRC and avoid provoking opposition from the international community regarding formal independence, this strategy helps preserve Taiwan’s current international position — one that is not subject to the PRC’s prerogatives, and allows for incremental progress toward statehood through tacit international cooperations and legal awareness. 28 A formal declaration remains difficult given both international reluctance to alter the status quo and the PRC’s threat of force. Lung-chu Chen, adopting an ‘evolutionary theory’, argues that Taiwan’s democratic development and distinct identity amount to statehood formed through collective self-determination. 29 However, scholars like Frank Chiang maintain that a formal declaration is essential to fully establish Taiwan’s statehood.30 These tensions — between declarative necessity, lack of recognition, and Taiwan’s democratic achievements — highlight the complexity and fragility of its contested sovereignty. Scholars in international law increasingly look beyond the Montevideo Convention as its four indicia cannot fully account for the complexities of contested sovereignty today. 31 While this article acknowledges a deficit in Taiwan’s formal statehood, it aligns with Roth’s view that Taiwan’s position — 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Jure Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 361. Kosovo Declaration of Independence (Kosovo, 17 February 2008). Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403. ‘Lista e Njohjeve’, Ministria e Punëve të Jashtme dhe Diasporës, Republika e Kosovës [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Republic of Kosovo] (Web Page, 2025) <https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve/>, archived at <perma.cc/5C6N-53LT>. Serbian media has claimed that the Kosovo Government conflated the number of states recognising its statehood, asserting only 84 have done so: ‘Kenija 84. a ne 118. zemlja koja je priznala Kosovo’, Blic (online, 27 March 2025) <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/ politika/kenija-84-a-ne-118-zemlja-koja-je-priznala-kosovo/gdnw4nk>, archived at <perma.cc/5U7M-4GMW>. See, eg, Crawford (n 11); Vidmar (n 21); Frank Chiang, The One-China Policy State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan’s International Legal Status (Elsevier 2018). Brad R Roth, ‘The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Unrecognized Taiwan as a RightBearer in the International Legal Order’ (2009) 4(1) East Asia Law Review 91. ibid. Lung-chu Chen, ‘The Evolution of Taiwan Statehood’ in The US-Taiwan-China Relationship in International Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2016) 83–4. Chiang (n 26). Montevideo Convention (n 18). 106