Exploring Atypical Citizenship Deprivation and Spillover Effects Specifically, it must determine if the interference was lawful, pursued a legitimate objective, and was necessary in a democratic society.89 The Taiwanese plaintiffs argued that their case could be assessed from two angles under art 8: first, as an interference with their right to identity and private life due to the forced imposition of a national identity upon them; and second, as a positive obligation on the respondent state to recognise their existing nationality, which they had previously accepted and was used by the plaintiffs for travel and entry into the country.90 To begin with, the plaintiffs contended that while art 8 of the ECHR does not explicitly confer the right to acquire a specific nationality, it remains indisputable that nationality constitutes a crucial aspect of an individual’s identity, citing the precedent set by the case Mennesson v France: ‘Whilst [art] 8 of the Convention does not guarantee the right to acquire a particular nationality, the fact remains that nationality is an element of a person’s identity’.91 Their application asserted that the national identity of Taiwanese people should fall under the protective umbrella of art 8 within its interpretation on the rights around ethnic identity.92 Cases such as Ciubotaru v Moldova underscored the importance of an individual’s ethnic identity, emphasising its significance under art 8.93 They also drew parallels with the case Tasev v North Macedonia,94 linking self-identification to a person’s ethnic identity, and the case Dadouch v Malta,95 which argued the importance of recognising personal legal status, particularly in the context of marriage. Therefore, the plaintiffs argued for their national identity with reference to art 8; in this, this author believes their arguments were with good reason. Firstly, with the cases mentioned above, the ECtHR confirmed that ‘the concept of “private” life’ is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition… [art] 8 protects in addition a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world’.96 In Dadouch v Malta, although the central issue was the recognition of marital status, the ECtHR affirmed that the Maltese State’s acknowledgment of marriage formed part of an individual’s personal and social identity, and thus fell within the scope of art 8 protections, particularly in relation to psychological integrity.97 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 ibid . TWMNMR (n 69); Annex to Liu and Others v Norway (n 84) 2,17. Genovese v Malta (ECtHR, Fourth Section, Application No 53124/09, 11 October 2011) [33]. See also Mennesson v France (ECtHR, Fourth Section, Application No 65192/11, 26 September 2014) [97] (‘Mennesson v France’). Annex to Liu and Others v Norway (n 84) 3–7. Dadouch v Malta (ECtHR, Fourth Section, Application No 38816/07, 20 July 2010) [47], cited in ibid 3–6 (‘Dadouch v Malta’). Tasev v North Macedonia (ECtHR, First Section, Application No 9825/13, 16 August 2019) [32]–[35], cited in Annex to Liu and Others v Norway (n 84) 6. Dadouch v Malta (n 93) [47]–[50], cited in Annex to Liu and Others v Norway (n 84) 6. Dadouch v Malta (n 93). See also Mennesson v France (n 91); Axel Springer AG v Germany (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 39954/08, 7 February 2012) [83]; Niemietz v Germany (ECtHR, Application No 13710/88, 16 December 1992) [29]; Pretty v the United Kingdom (ECtHR, Fourth Section, Application No 2346/02, 29 April 2002) [61], [67]; Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine (ECtHR, Fifth Section, Application No 21722/11, 9 January 2013) [165]–[167]; El Masri v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Application No 39630/09, 13 December 2012) [248]–[250], which concerned the applicant’s secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention. See also Guide on art 8 of the ECHR (n 86) 48, 66. The ECtHR further affirmed the connection between the registration of marriage and the recognition of one’s legal civil status, stating that ‘which undoubtedly concerns both private and family life, comes within the scope of [art] 8 § 1’: see Dadouch v Malta (n 93) [48]. 117