the FPI who protested the verbal allocation of two key ministries—Defense and Interior—to the rebel groups. President Gbagbo’s return to Abidjan did little to subdue the protests. Instead, his public statement that the accords were “propositions” cast doubt on his commitment to the agreement. In early February the United Nations Security Council issued a statement of support for the accords and gave Chapter VII authorization to the French and West African troops to protect civilians in their zones of operation.27 Following the protests in Abidjan, an impasse ensued on the political front throughout February and most of March 2003, despite numerous efforts to further the peace process. A summit in Accra in early March resulted in the preliminary distribution of cabinet posts in the new government of reconciliation, as fighting continued in the west of the country. As talks continued over the next steps in the peace process, reports of massacres emerged from the west, where it became increasingly clear that both the government and rebel forces were using Liberian fighters in a proxy war. Throughout March and early April, MPCI-appointed members of the government refused to take their seats in Abidjan citing security concerns. Security in the Toulepleu area declined as Liberian fighters on both sides fought each other and launched attacks into neighboring Liberia. Thousands of civilians fled the west for the increasingly uncertain refuge of Liberia and Guinea. International and local concern over the situation in the west mounted through April, culminating in a meeting between Liberian President Charles Taylor and President Gbagbo in Togo in late-April, and an agreement to monitor the border through a quadripartite force composed of Ivorian government and rebels forces, Liberian forces and French/ECOWAS forces.28 A cease-fire was signed in early May as members of the government of reconciliation took their seats in Abidjan for the first time. A United Nations mission—MINUCI—composed of military liaison personnel and civilian human rights monitors was also approved by the United Nations Security Council in early May. By late-May, the security situation in the west was improving as many of the Liberian fighters left the area, but the humanitarian situation remained dire, with large numbers of civilians lacking access to clean water, food and health care. In early June French and ECOWAS forces moved in to secure the major towns in the west and monitor the cease-fire, and the curfew was lifted. IV. THE “WAR IN THE MOUTH”: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL RHETORIC AND THE MEDIA “Even before the war began, there were ‘dialogues of war’ among Ivorians. There was no war on the ground, but there was war in the mouth.” Ivorian refugee, Nonah refugee camp, Guinea Throughout over ten weeks of interviews with victims and witnesses to the violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Watch was consistently told—by Ivorians, Burkinabé, long-time observers, victims—that the Ivorian media and the political discourse of key politicians played a crucial role in inflaming tensions, inciting fear and hatred, and galvanizing conflict, not only since September 19, 2002, but long before. The role of the Ivorian media Côte d’Ivoire is home to a plethora of media: at least a dozen daily newspapers have wide circulation in the capital and major towns around the country. Local and international radio programs have a wide audience, and both Ivorian and international television programs are available in Abidjan and in many large and small towns. Yet the variety of media available to Ivorians, probably unmatched in any other country in the region, has not guaranteed access to objective news coverage for two main reasons. First is the politicization of the Ivorian media, particularly the print media, which almost entirely lacks independence, given its links to the main political parties. Each major political party has a newspaper that acts as 27 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1464, February 4, 2003. S/RES/1464/2003. Chapter VII authorization permitted the West African and French forces to “take the necessary steps” to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their troops and to “ensure…the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence….” 28 John Zodzi, “Ivory Coast, Liberia back force for chaotic border,” Reuters, April 26, 2003. Human Rights Watch 12 August 2003, Vol. 15, No. 14 (A)