Degrees of Statelessness unconsolidated and limited. Our findings include evidence that it may be increasing. 59 Writing in 2005, Nicole Constable observed that the contemporary patterns of marriage migration in Asia reflected the gendered nature of the movement, noting that the majority of the ‘women move from poorer countries to wealthier ones, from the less developed global “south”; to the more industrialized “north”’. 60 Since the early beginnings of research on marriage migration within the region, many assumptions have been made regarding the motives of the women — which stem from the connection between poverty, opportunism and a presumed lack of agency. These assumptions have in turn fed into increasingly stringent regulation within receiving states, particularly in terms of nationality laws. 61 Official state responses have slowly evolved into acceptance of marriage migration as a development strategy for the women, 62 and the government has responded to issues of de jure statelessness of this cohort. However, the laws and policies of Vietnam have not kept pace with the issues raised by returned children of the marriages. Can Tho is the fourth largest city in Vietnam, nestled in the heart of the Mekong Delta. With a population of just over 1.5 million, Can Tho is the largest city in the Mekong Delta and an important economic hub for south Vietnam — second only to Ho Chi Minh City. The Can Tho region — which consists of Can Tho City and five surrounding provinces — is largely known for tourism due to its picturesque rolling rice fields, rural canals and floating markets. However, the region is also characterised by large-scale poverty and as a result, has a high rate of emigration, including through marriage migration. Can Tho is the region from which the largest number of Vietnamese women who migrate through marriage originate (approximately 100 per month regionally), and consequently, the region is likely to hold the highest number of marriage migrants to have repatriated back from overseas. 63 Although many women find relative ‘success’ in marriages that result from the above trends, many do not. In addition to standard marital breakdowns, marriage migrants are also vulnerable to physical and emotional abuse, forced labour and exploitation. If and/or when these marriages subsequently break down, some women may choose to stay abroad. However, many are either forced or choose to return to Vietnam. As these families mature, increasingly more women have been returning to their hometowns with children from these unions. However, the women often choose to take the children back to Vietnam without obtaining 59 60 61 62 63 Tran Thi Phung Ha, ‘Draft Report for the Project: Development of a Legal Framework for International Marriage Migration (IMM)’ (Draft Paper, Can Tho University, December 2017). A copy of this paper on file with the authors. Constable (n 7) 4. In Taiwan marriage migrants seeking citizenship until 2016 were required to renounce their previous citizenship prior to applying for and acquiring Taiwanese citizenship. This resulted in many women becoming stateless as they were unable to complete the naturalisation process or subsequently lost Taiwanese nationality on death or divorce of the husband. The majority of the women affected were Vietnamese. See Kitty McKinsey, ‘Divorce Leaves Some Vietnamese Women Broken-Hearted and Stateless’ (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 February, 2007) <http://www.unhcr.org/45d324428.html>; Kitty McKinsey ‘Vietnam Sets Pace for Asia with New Law to Prevent Statelessness’ (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1 July 2009) <http://www.unhcr.org/4a4b809d9.html>. Vietnamese Migration Abroad (n 55) 39–40. This estimation derives from interviews conducted by Dr Ha and her team and reflects their estimations: Ha (n 59). 79