person enjoys a relevant link (in particular by birth on the territory, descent, marriage
or habitual residence).
23. The meaning of “State” should be based on the criteria generally considered
necessary for a State to exist in international law. As such, relevant factors are those
found in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (permanent
population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with
other States) coupled with other considerations that have subsequently emerged
(effectiveness of the entity in question, right of self-determination and the consent of
the State which previously exercised control over the territory in question).
24. Whether or not an entity has been recognised as a State by other States is indicative
(rather than determinative) of whether it has achieved statehood.
25. Where an entity’s purported statehood appears to have arisen through the use of force,
its treatment under Article 1(1) will raise issues regarding the obligations of third
States with regard to breaches of jus cogens norms.
26. In keeping with the current state of international law, whilst an effective central
government is critical for a new State to emerge, an existing State that no longer has
such a government because of civil war or other instability can still be considered as a
“State” for the purposes of Article 1(1).
27. The position of so-called “sinking island States” raises questions under Article 1(1),
as the permanent disappearance of habitable physical territory, in all likelihood
preceded by loss of population and government, may mean the “State” will no longer
exist for the purposes of this provision. However, the situation is unprecedented and
may necessitate progressive development of international law to deal with the
preservation of the identity of the communities affected.
II. De facto stateless persons
The participants broadly agreed that some categories of persons hitherto regarded as de facto
stateless are actually de jure stateless, and therefore particular care should be taken before
concluding that a person is de facto stateless rather than de jure stateless. This is particularly
important as there is an international treaty regime for the protection of stateless persons as
defined in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention and to prevent and reduce statelessness (most
notably the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions). However, there is no similar regime
for de facto stateless persons. A number of participants referred to gaps in the existing
international protection regime that affect de facto stateless persons in particular. On the
other hand, some participants expressed the view that the concept of de facto stateless persons
is problematic. Reference was made in particular to some extremely broad interpretations of
the term.
5