Sea Level Rise and Climate Statelessness notes: ‘people with ineffective nationality quite often find themselves locked in a complex legal limbo’.81 The threshold against which the protection afforded by the 1954 Convention should be assessed is thus a low one. In the absence of any pre-emptive agreement or solution, EDPs would eventually need to find a safe haven beyond the borders of their state of origin. Once this becomes uninhabitable, it is likely that they would find themselves unable to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality and would thus become de facto stateless. This situation could last until an EDP gains another nationality, or until their state of nationality is accepted as having lost its statehood. In this context, the relevance of the protection afforded by the 1954 Convention should thus be determined in relation to that available to de facto stateless persons. Therefore, the very existence of a legal framework could offer valuable help to EDPs seeking a legal status. While the 1954 Convention trails behind the 1951 Convention in many ways, stateless status is nevertheless well defined in international law, and under different regional and domestic jurisdictions. 82 The shortcomings of the law on statelessness identified in Part III(B) would likely still undermine its implementation and universality, but were it possible, EDPs who were able to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the 1954 Convention would still likely fare better than those remaining de facto stateless. As several states face an existential threat because of climate change, there is a distinct possibility that different states may experience different fates or different timelines, both environmentally and legally. The coexistence of different timelines would mean that de facto and de jure EDPs could find themselves within the same jurisdiction but with differing status and levels of protection, assuming their state of residence was party to the 1954 Convention and that the latter’s protection was enacted through an SDP. In such a context, the protection afforded to de jure stateless EDPs could also benefit de facto stateless EDPs. In the context of postSoviet statelessness, for instance, legal advances benefitting de jure stateless persons have been observed to be a ‘catalyst leading to legally productive changes for other noncitizens — or de facto stateless persons — in precarious legal situations’.83 Indeed, even if no EDPs from LLISs were to qualify as stateless persons under the 1954 Convention, the latter could still provide helpful guidance for receiving states. Since the UNHCR had its mandate on statelessness confirmed and strengthened in 1995, there has been a positive trend towards better protection for stateless persons and increased protection against the emergence of statelessness.84 Although it still lacks widespread ratification, several states have become parties to it in recent years, the latest being Iceland on 21 January 2021.85 From only 55 state parties in 2003, this number has almost grown twofold since, currently numbering 95 (as of 2021).86 This may be attributed to the UNHCR’s renewed efforts to raise awareness to the problem of statelessness and the 81 82 83 84 85 86 Agnieszka Kubal, ‘Can Statelessness Be Legally Productive? The Struggle for the Rights of Noncitizens in Russia’ (2020) 24(2) Citizenship Studies 193, 197. See also Dobrić (n 12) 59. Kubal (n 81) 197. ibid 203. Foster and Lambert (n 48) 47–49. ‘Signatories of the 1954 Convention’ (n 39). ibid. 303