Sea Level Rise and Climate Statelessness authors, and thus left potentially under-researched in this specific context.17 The reasons for this can be summarily divided into two broad categories. First, the law on statelessness is argued to come into play too late to be of any relevance, due to the fact that a deterritorialised LLIS would likely retain its statehood long after its population has had to relocate, or its territory has been fully submerged. Second, the shortcomings of the 1954 Convention and its implementation essentially render it useless as a protection framework. However, while these conclusions may be warranted in the context(s) they have so far been discussed to apply in, they do not cover the full range of possible futures. This article adopts a ‘worst-case scenario’ approach, revisiting the conclusions previously reached on the relevance of the 1954 Convention in this light. The article first sets the scene by outlining the idea of climate statelessness and how the concept has been discussed in literature thus far. This is followed by the introduction of a scenario-based approach, which is then used to determine the extent to which the law on statelessness could prove relevant for the displaced nationals of LLIS, and in which context. To do so, the article revisits the arguments presented earlier that have hitherto justified the relative lack of interest in the 1954 Convention’s relevance for EDPs from LLISs. TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE A Too Late The first conclusion reached by most authors who have discussed the relevance of the 1954 Convention for EDPs from LLISs is that it is very unlikely that it would apply when it is needed the most, ie during or immediately after the cross-border migration of those displaced by climate change.18 Assessing that the law on statelessness would therefore be triggered too late to have any practical relevance is directly related to how likely an LLIS is to maintain its statehood beyond the loss of its physical indicia (ie population and territory). While the possibility of deterritorialised statehood may initially seem counterintuitive if approached purely based on the ‘traditional’ criteria of statehood,19 several arguments have been raised to support the possibility of a LLIS maintaining its statehood beyond the loss of its territory. The first argument proposed is that the ‘minimum threshold’ account of statehood, embodied by the criteria found in art 1 of the Montevideo Convention 17 18 19 Jane McAdam’s assessment is that ‘the statelessness treaties provide a very weak “solution” in the present context, which is already highly contingent on other factors.’ McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 139–43. Heather Alexander and Jonathan Simon conclude that the statelessness conventions ‘do not provide a ready solution [to the plight of EDPs]’: Heather Alexander and Jonathan Simon, ‘Sinking into Statelessness’ (2014) 19 Tilburg Law Review 20, 25. Jenny Grote Stoutenburg also posits that the loss of statehood of a LLIS would result in de jure statelessness for its displaced population but concludes her analysis on the relevance of the stateless status in this context by emphasising the shortcomings discussed in Part III.B. Stoutenburg (n 6), 409. McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 142. These criteria are found in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art 1. They are commonly accepted to reflect international custom: see eg Abhimanyu George Jain, ‘The 21st Century Atlantis: The International Law of Statehood and Climate Change-Induced Loss of Territory’ (2014) 50(1) Stanford Journal of International Law 1, 17; McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 128. 291