2020
Statelessness & Citizenship Review
2(2)
Chapter One covers why and how states provide citizenship through birth, on
the basis of place of birth (jus soli) and on the basis of parentage (jus sanguinis). 8
While states theoretically could wait to confer citizenship until adulthood, ‘birth
citizenship is a practical necessity and an easy mechanism for replicating
membership on an intergenerational basis’. 9 While heavily tilted toward US law
and experience, Spiro details the various approaches states have taken and do take
in providing citizenship at birth, that birth in a territory can lead automatically to
citizenship in some places, while in others territorial birth citizenship depends on
parental immigration status or meeting certain residency requirements. He
highlights how the US has excluded marginalised groups from birthright
citizenship, such as African-Americans and Native Americans in the past, or
persons born in the US territory of American Samoa in the present. 10 Spiro also
points out the feudal roots of territorial birthright citizenship, whereby ‘individuals
were born into the protection of sovereigns, to whom they owed perpetual
allegiance in return’. 11 This concept introduces an enduring principle of
citizenship, that it fundamentally involves an exchange of government protection
for an individual’s loyalty. These points help convey to the reader that the extent
of government protection and the nature of the claim a state has on personal loyalty
are central questions shaping citizenship in law and practice.
Chapter Two covers naturalisation, the granting of citizenship after birth. 12 As
Spiro writes, ‘[i]n this migration-centered narrative, naturalization is alternatively
considered a reflection of integration into the polity or a tool for perfecting it’. 13
As states see naturalisation ‘as a way to cement ties with useful constituencies’, 14
naturalisation laws and processes exhibit a wide range of state discretion in
determining who to recognise as a member and under what conditions. Unlike
birthright citizenship, no state imposes naturalisation by operation of law, thus
requiring affirmative efforts and consent on the part of both the state and the
individual. 15 While naturalisation historically ‘represented a transfer of loyalty
from one sovereign to another’, 16 more recent laws and practices display an array
of combinations reflecting different degrees of state protection and personal ties
or loyalty. Some past and current laws have applied racial and religious criteria to
naturalisation eligibility. 17 Some countries, such as Germany and Spain, grant
citizenship to certain groups on the basis of past persecution. 18 Most countries
impose residency requirements, typically between five to ten years, as a way to
assess character and law-abidingness and to help assure successful sociopolitical
integration. 19 Bases for faster naturalisation include special talents in science,
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ibid 6.
ibid.
ibid 15. Other native-born groups excluded from citizenship, such as the Bidoons in Kuwait
and the Rohingya in Myanmar, are discussed in Chapter Five on citizenship deprivation and
statelessness: at 131.
ibid 8.
ibid 25.
ibid.
ibid 26.
ibid 51.
ibid 25.
ibid 27–29.
ibid 56-58.
ibid 30–31.
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